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SOLICITATION, EXTORTION, AND THE FCPA
Joseph W Yockey*
The U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) prohibits firms from paying bribes
to foreign officials to obtain or retain business. It is one of the most significant and
feared statutes for companies operating abroad. FCPA enforcement has never been
higher and nine-figure monetary penalties are not uncommon. This makes the imple-
mentation of robust FCPA compliance programs of paramount importance. Unfortu-
nately, regardless of whether they have compliance measures in place, many firms report
that they face bribe requests and extortionate threats from foreign public officials on a
daily basis. The implications of these demand-side pressures have gone largely unex-
plored in the FCPA context. This Article helps fill that gap. First, I describe the nature
and frequency of bribe solicitation and extortion to illustrate the scope of the problem
and the costs it imposes on firms and other market participants. I then argue that
current FCPA enforcement policy in cases of solicitation and extortion raises several
unique corporate governance and compliance challenges and ultimately poses a risk of
overdeterrence. Though these concerns can be partially addressed through enhanced
statutory guidance, I conclude by urging regulators to shift some of their focus from
bribe-paying firms in order to directly target bribe-seeking public officials. Confronting
the market for bribe demands in this way will help reduce corruption in general while
also allowing employees and agents to spend less time worrying about how to respond to
bribe requests and more time on legitimate, value-enhancing transactions.
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INTRODUCTION
Maintaining compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA)I represents one of the most significant issues facing American
firms today. The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) recently said that
enforcing the FCPA, which prohibits firms from bribing foreign offi-
cials to obtain business, is now its top priority-"second only to fight-
ing terrorism."2 This has translated into a sharp rise in FCPA case
1 Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78dd (2006)).
2 See Laurence A. Urgenson et al., New Bumps and Tolls Along the Road to FCPA
Settlements, Bus. CRIMES BULL., Nov. 2009, at 1.
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volume during the past decade.3 Last year alone saw more FCPA
actions than ever before in the statute's thirty-three-year history, with
resulting fines routinely reaching into the hundreds of millions of dol-
lars.4 Estimates further suggest that federal regulators currently have
over 200 open FCPA investigations,5 leading to the observation that
FCPA enforcement is "at an all time high and likely to remain there."6
In many respects the increasing rate of enforcement is a positive
development. Bribery blights lives, undermines democracy, and dis-
torts markets. The FCPA's resurgence is a key part of the global anti-
corruption response and encourages firms to adopt compliance pro-
grams designed to counter corrupt practices. The problem is that, no
matter how elaborate a firm's compliance efforts might be, they can
do little to curb the market for bribe demands. Firms report that they
continue to receive demands for bribes from foreign officials on a
daily basis.7 In some cases this means being solicited for bribes from
customs officials in exchange for moving goods in or out of the coun-
try. In other situations it means falling victim to extortion, where pay-
ing a ransom to a foreign official becomes the only way to avoid harm
to one's person, property, or existing economic interests.
Bribe solicitation and extortion thus pose constant challenges for
transnational firms but have received only minimal attention in the
newly developing literature on the FCPA. This Article seeks to fill that
gap by exploring the problem of solicitation and extortion from the
3 The DOJ and United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
brought almost twice as many FCPA cases between 2007 and 2009 than in the statute's
previous twenty-eight-year history. See Amy Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement,
Informal Legislation: The Unruly Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 GA. L.
REv. 489, 522 (2011).
4 See id. at 492-93.
5 See Nathan Vardi, How Federal Crackdown on Bribery Hurts Business and Enriches
Insiders, FORBES, May 24, 2010, at 72, available at http://www.forbes.com/forbes/
2010/0524/business-weatherford-kbr-corruption-bribery-racket.html (reporting 150
open criminal FCPA investigations); see also ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV.,
UNITED STATES: PHASE 3 REPORT ON THE APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION ON COMBAT-
ING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS
AND THE 2009 REVISED RECOMMENDATION ON COMBATING BRIBERY IN INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 11 (2010) [hereinafter OECD Phase 3 Report], available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/49/46213841.pdf (reporting over 150 criminal
FCPA investigations and over eighty civil FCPA investigations ongoing).
6 Westbrook, supra note 3, at 523 (quoting OliverJ. Armas, The U.S. Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act-An Overview, 22 INT'L C. PRACTICUM 31, 37 (2009)).
7 See INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ET. AL., RESIST: RESISTING EXTORTION AND
SOLICITATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS 6 (2011) [hereinafter RESIST]; Philip
Urofsky, Extortionate Demands Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 26 WHITE COLLAR
CRIME REP. 848, 884 (2008).
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perspective of corporate governance. Firms know that giving into
bribe demands-regardless of the circumstances in which they were
made-is generally no excuse to liability. What this Article shows,
however, is that a variety of obstacles exist which make designing effi-
cient internal controls to resist solicitation and extortion increasingly
difficult.
Part I sets up the analytical framework by discussing the FCPA's
key provisions and the recent upsurge in FCPA enforcement. Part II
then introduces data on the nature and frequency of bribe solicitation
and extortion to illustrate the scope of the problem and the costs
these practices impose on firms and other market participants.
Part III turns to the governance challenges that result from solici-
tation and extortion. This requires looking at two overlapping issues.
The first stems from the fact that firms investing in foreign markets
typically need to retain local agents to navigate unfamiliar laws and
customs. These agents are notoriously difficult to monitor and often
go to great lengths to hide bribe and ransom payments from the firms
that hired them. Firms are then exposed to vicarious liability (civilly
and criminally) for the wrongs committed by their agents, even when
the firms made every effort to prevent the wrongdoing.
The risk of vicarious liability feeds directly into the second issue.
Instead of helping to protect firms from solicitation or extortion, fed-
eral regulators have actually made compliance more difficult due to
their aggressive interpretation of several key aspects of the FCPA. Not
all bribes under the FCPA are created equal. The statute affirmatively
allows payments made to prompt an official to take "routine" action,8
payments that were not made for the purpose of getting business,9
and payments that were not made to "foreign" officials.10 Many pay-
ments made in response to bribe demands arguably fall within these
protected areas and yet have resulted in FCPA actions based on
increasingly expansive enforcement theories. As regulators continue
to push the boundaries of statutory interpretation, firms will find it
difficult to predict ex ante whether conduct that appears permissible
under the FCPA's terms will later expose them to sanction. This in
turn hinders efforts to design monitoring programs that will prevent
illegal payments without also deterring employees from pursuing
legitimate transactions or engaging in socially desirable risk-taking.
As Part IV shows, some of the foregoing issues can be addressed
through enhanced statutory guidance intended to provide firms with
8 See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(b) (2006).
9 See id. at § 78dd-1 (a).
10 See id.
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better understanding of enforcement standards. This should lead to
greater predictability and consistency in the administration of the
FCPA. Still another way to ease the pressures generated by solicitation
and extortion would involve expanding the scope of anti-corruption
efforts in order to directly confront the demand-side origins of cor-
ruption. This would require regulators to shift some of their focus
from bribe-paying firms in order to target bribe-seeking public offi-
cials. To be sure, my argument is not that bribery should be tolerated
or that bribe-paying firms should avoid sanction. Rather, the goal of
confronting bribe-seeking officials would simply be to add balance to
existing regulatory efforts by addressing both supply and demand in
corrupt transactions.
The DOJ has made some initial strides on the demand side by
seeking to disgorge profits from corrupt foreign officials who receive
bribes. But much more needs to be done. This includes improving
levels of cooperation with other countries to reduce the frequency of
bribe demands and working with non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) and other groups dedicated to fighting corruption. Through
these and other initiatives, demand-side intervention has the potential
to reduce corruption in general while also allowing firms and their
agents to spend less time worrying about how to respond to bribe
requests and more time on value-enhancing transactions.
I. FCPA ENFORCEMENT
A. Background
Enacted in 1977, the FCPA was the first statute in history to pro-
hibit firms in one country from bribing government officials in
another for the purpose of getting business. Its origins can be traced
to two scandals from the 1970s. The first involved Lockheed Corpora-
tion, which disclosed to regulators in 1971 that it paid multi-million
dollar bribes to officials in several countries in order to secure govern-
ment contracts. 1 This might not have made the splash that it did if it
were not for the fact that Lockheed paid these bribes shortly after
receiving a $250 million federal loan guarantee to keep it out of bank-
ruptcy.12 The discovery of Lockheed's bribery embarrassed the
11 See Andrew Brady Spalding, The Irony of International Business Law: U.S. Progres-
sivism, China's New Laissez Faire, and Their Impact in the Developing World, 59 UCLA L.
REv. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 19), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
vol3/papers/cfm?abstract id.=1795563.
12 See Mike Koehler, The Facade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT'L L. 907, 912
n.6 (2010).
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United States, as well as the countries whose officials received bribes,
including Japan, Italy, and the Netherlands"
The second scandal was Watergate. In the course of investigating
then-President Nixon's re-election campaign, the SEC uncovered evi-
dence that over 400 American companies made questionable pay-
ments to foreign officials during the 1970s in amounts totaling
approximately $300 million. 14 These payments were often made
through the use of "slush funds" that originated in offshore bank
accounts or shell companies created for the sole purpose of facilitat-
ing bribery transactions or illegal campaign contributions aimed at
securing business opportunities abroad. Congress passed the FCPA
on the basis of these discoveries as an amendment to the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act)1 5 in an effort to "restore public
confidence in the integrity of the American business system." 16
The FCPA's approach to fighting corruption relies on two com-
ponents. First, at its core, the statute's anti-bribery provisions prohibit
the payment of bribes to foreign officials for the purpose of obtaining
or retaining business. Second, the statute requires issuers of publicly
traded securities to maintain accurate books and records and to insti-
tute various internal accounting controls. The latter provisions sup-
plement the statute's anti-bribery rules by enhancing financial
transparency and assisting firm management in preventing or
detecting questionable payments.
1. Anti-Bribery Provisions
The FCPA's anti-bribery provisions prohibit covered persons
from corruptly providing money or anything of value to foreign offi-
cials for the purpose of obtaining or retaining business.17 Covered
persons under the statute include (1) issuers, (2) domestic concerns,
(3) individual officers, directors, employees, agents, or shareholders
of issuers or domestic concerns acting on their behalf, and (4) any
other persons or entities (or their officers, directors, employees,
agents, or shareholders), while in U.S. territory, who use the mails or
13 See S. REP. No. 95-114, at 3 (1977) ("Foreign governments friendly to the
United States in Japan, Italy, and the Netherlands have come under intense pressure
from their own people. The image of American democracy abroad has been
tarnished.").
14 See Carolyn Lindsey, More than You Bargained For: Successor Liability Under the
U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 35 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 959, 961 (2009).
15 Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78pp).
16 S. REP. No. 95-114, at 4.
17 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 (a), 78dd-2(a), 78dd-3(a).
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interstate commerce to commit acts in furtherance of bribery1 8 The
statute defines "issuers" as firms that have a class of securities regis-
tered under section 12 of the Exchange Act or that are required to file
periodic reports with the SEC (i.e., public companies).19 "Domestic
concerns" include United States citizens, nationals, or residents, as
well as business entities organized under United States law or those
with their principal place of business in the United States.20
The bribes prohibited by the FCPA are not limited to monetary
payments. They include the provision of "anything of value," with no
exception for payments of de minimis value.21 The statute does, how-
ever, require that any alleged bribes be paid to a "foreign official." 22
This term is broadly defined. 23 It includes any officer or employee of
a foreign government, or of any department, agency or instrumental-
ity of that government, as well as any foreign political party, party offi-
cial, or candidate for foreign office.24 Also included is any third party,
such as an agent, distributor, or joint venture partner, who is given
money with the knowledge that at least part of that money will be
"offered, given, or promised, directly or indirectly" to any of the afore-
mentioned persons.25
18 See id. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78dd-3. This last category of covered persons was
added pursuant to amendments in 1998 that were necessary to bring the FCPA into
compliance with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's
Convention Against Corruption (OECD Convention). See International Anti-Bribery
and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, § 4, 112 Stat. 3302, 3306-09.
The FCPA has been amended twice. See id.; Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amend-
ments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1415 (1988). The 1998 amendments,
prompted by the OECD Convention, extended the FCPA's jurisdiction to reach more
conduct that takes place outside of U.S. territory. See § 2(c), 112 Stat. at 3303
(prohibiting bribery committed outside U.S. territory by U.S. persons and by issuers
and anyone acting on behalf of issuers). They also expanded liability to include any-
one who commits violations of the FCPA while in U.S. territory (including foreign
companies and foreign individuals, as well as foreign nationals who are agents or
employees of U.S. issuers), and clarified the FCPA's prohibition against payments
made to secure "improper advantages." See id. § 4, 112 Stat. at 3306-09. Prior to
1998, the other amendment occurred in 1988, when Congress added affirmative
defenses to FCPA liability and narrowed the requirement for "knowing" violations.
See id. § 5003, 102 Stat. at 1416-18.
19 See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (a).
20 See id. § 78dd-2(h).
21 See id. § 78dd-1 (a).
22 See id.
23 See infra notes 74-86 and accompanying text.
24 See 15 U.S.C. §§78dd-1(a)(2), 78dd-1(f)(1)(A), 78dd-2(a)(2), 78dd-
2(h) (2) (A), 78dd-3(a) (2), 78dd-3(f) (2) (A).
25 See id. § 78dd-1 (a) (3).
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If a bribe is paid to a foreign official, the FCPA requires proof
that the defendant acted with "corrupt[ ]" intent.26 This involves
looking into the purpose of the payment. Though undefined in the
statute, the FCPA's legislative history says that a corrupt payment is
one intended to induce the recipient to misuse her official position to
direct business wrongfully to the payer or to any other person.27
Unless the defendant confesses, intent must be inferred from the facts
and circumstances in each case. Relevant facts include the size of the
alleged bribe, as well as the total number of bribes paid to a foreign
official over time.28
Not all payments that resemble bribes are unlawful under the
FCPA. The statute's anti-bribery provisions contain one express
exception and two affirmative defenses to liability. Payments that sim-
ply "expedite or .. . secure the performance of routine governmental
action by a foreign official" are permissible under the statute's facilita-
tion (or "grease") payment exception (presumably because they are
not made with a corrupt intent).29 This exception is discussed exten-
sively in Part III. The FCPA's two affirmative defenses are available for
payments that (1) constitute reasonable "promotion" expenses or (2)
are lawful under the written laws of another country.30 The former
has generally been applied to modest payments that cover things like
airfare and hotel accommodations for foreign officials when used in
connection with promoting or demonstrating a company's products
or services. 31 The latter requires that the law in question "be affirma-
tively stated and written; neither negative implication, custom, nor
26 See id. §§ 78dd-1 (a), 78dd-2(a), 78dd-3(a).
27 See Lay-Person's Guide to the FCPA, U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE, LAY-PERSON's GUIDE TO
THE FCPA, http://wwwjustice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/lay-persons-guide.pdf
(last visited Oct. 13, 2011); see also H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 7-8 (1977) ("The word
'corruptly' is used to in order to make clear that the offer, payment, promise, or gift,
must be intended to induce the recipient to misuse his official position.").
28 See F. Joseph Warin et al., FCPA Compliance in China and the Gifts and Hospitality
Challenge, 5 VA. L. & Bus. REv. 33, 62 (2010).
29 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(b), 78dd-2(b), 78dd-3(b).
30 See id. §§ 78dd-1(c)(1)-(2), 78dd-2(c)(1)-(2), 78dd-3(c)(1)-(2).
31 See Thomas Fox, Best Practices Regarding FCPA Policy on Gifts, Business Entertain-
ment, and Travel for Governmental Officials, CORP. COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS (July 23, 2009),
http://www.corporatecomplianceinsights.com/2009/best-practices-fcpa-doj-policy-
on-gifts-business-entertainment-travel-foreign-governmental-officials/ ("[R]easonable
and bona fide business expenses related to the promotion, demonstration, or expla-
nation of products or services . .. are within the affirmative defenses [of the FCPA].").
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tacit approval" is sufficient. 32 This defense is of limited practical value
since no country currently has laws expressly permitting bribery.33
2. Accounting and Internal Control Provisions
The FCPA's accounting and internal control provisions are nar-
rower than the anti-bribery provisions in that they only apply to issuers
of securities traded on United States exchanges.3 4 The accounting
provisions require issuers to "make and keep books, records, and
accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the
transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer."3 5
The internal control provisions require issuers to "devise and
maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide
reasonable assurances" that (1) transactions are authorized by man-
agement, (2) financial statements are prepared in accordance with
proper accounting principles, and (3) recorded assets are periodically
checked against existing assets to ensure that there are no discrepan-
cies.36 The SEC evaluates the adequacy of internal accounting con-
trols by considering factors such as the role of the board of directors,
the quality of the communication of corporate policies, the assign-
ment of authority and responsibility, integrity of personnel, accounta-
bility for performance and compliance with firm policies and
32 Westbrook, supra note 3, at 506 (quoting DAVID KRAROFF ET AL., FCPA: HAN-
DLING INCREASED GLOBAL ANTI-CORRUPTION ENFORCEMENT 3 (2008), available at http:/
/www.mayerbrown.com/publications/article.asp?id=6386).
33 See id. at 506-07 (citing United States v. Kozeny, 582 F. Supp. 2d 535, 537-40
(S.D.N.Y. 2008); see also infra notes 226-28 (discussing Kozeny's holding that lack of
domestic prosecution for bribery offenses or the availability of affirmative defenses
under domestic law does not mean that bribery will be considered "legal" for the
purposes of the FCPA's affirmative defense). This defense does not apply if a foreign
country simply lacks domestic bribery laws or when a payer is able to invoke an affirm-
ative defense to bribery charges under local law.
34 Compare supra note 18, with 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (2) (illustrating that only issu-
ers of registered securities are covered by the accounting and internal control
provisions).
35 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (2) (A). The SEC promulgated two rules to implement the
accounting provisions. Exchange Act Rule 13b2-1 prohibits any person from falsify-
ing any book, record, or account subject to the FCPA. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-1
(2010). Exchange Act Rule 13b2-2 prohibits issuers from making misleading state-
ments to auditors and outside accountants who prepare an issuer's reports. See 17
C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2 (2010). The term "reasonable detail" in this context means "such
level of detail and degree of assurance as would satisfy prudent officials in the con-
duct of their own affairs." 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (7).
36 Id. § 78m (b) (2) (B). The term "reasonable assurances" in this context means
"such level of detail and degree of assurance as would satisfy prudent officials in the
conduct of their own affairs." Id. § 78m(b) (7).
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procedures, and the objectivity and effectiveness of internal
auditing.37
B. Recent Enforcement Trends
For most of its thirty-three-year history, the FCPA was enforced
only sporadically and penalties imposed on firms rarely exceeded one
million dollars.38 This is no longer true today. Speaking in November
2010, Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer said that "FCPA
enforcement activity is stronger than it's ever been-and getting
stronger."39
The surge in enforcement has largely occurred in the past dec-
ade. The following chart40 lists the number of FCPA enforcement
actions brought by the DOJ and SEC from 2002 to 2010:









2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
O SEC 3 1 3 6 7 17 9 11 19
EDOJ 4 5 3 7 6 21 16 32 28
37 See SEC Notice of Withdrawal of Proposed Rules Regarding Statement of Man-
agement on Internal Accounting Controls, 45 Fed. Reg. 40,134, 40,139-40, 40,142
(June 13, 1980); Statement of Management on Internal Accounting Controls,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-16877, 20 SEC Docket 310 (June 6, 1980).
38 See Westbrook, supra note 3, at 495. The FCPA provides for both criminal and
civil penalties, and is enforced by both the DOJ and the SEC. The SEC has civil
enforcement authority only and is further limited to regulating only issuers and their
directors, officers, employees, and agents. This means that the DOJ is responsible for
all criminal enforcement of the FCPA, as well as for civil enforcement actions brought
against non-issuers.
39 GIssoN, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, 2010 YEAR-END FCPA UPDATE 1 (2011), avail-
able at http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/documents/2010yearendFCPA
update.pdf.
40 SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, FCPA DIGEST OF CASES AND REVIEW RELEASES
RELATING TO BRIBES TO FOREIGN OFFICIALS UNDER THE FOREIGN CORRUFr PRACTICES
AcT OF 1977, at i (2011), available at http://www.shearman.com/files/upload/FCPA-
Digest-Jan-201 1.pdf.
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As this data reveals, the biggest spike in enforcement occurred
within the past four years. This same period also produced cases with
record-setting monetary sanctions.41 In 2008, Siemens AG agreed to
settle FCPA-related charges with United States and German authori-
ties for a total of $1.6 billion-still the largest FCPA settlement ever
recorded.4 2 The previous high for an FCPA monetary sanction came
in 2007 when Baker Hughes settled charges for $44 million.4 3
One year after the Siemens AG settlement, Halliburton and its
former engineering and construction subsidiary Kellogg, Brown &
Root settled FCPA charges with the DOJ and SEC for $579 million.4 4
The year after that, 2010, then saw eight of the ten costliest FCPA-
related settlements in history. 45 The DOJ and SEC settled with the
Dutch construction firm Snamprogetti Netherlands B.V. for $365 mil-
lion, the Swiss shipping company Panalpina World Transport (Hold-
ing) Ltd. for $156 million, the French construction firm Technip S.A.
for $338 million, the British defense contractor BAE Systems PLC for
$400 million, and German automaker Daimler AG for $185 million.4 6
41 Firms face criminal fines up to $2 million per violation of the FCPA's anti-
bribery provisions, which applies to each illegal payment, or twice the gross pecuniary
gain or loss resulting from the offense, whichever is greater. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-
2(g), 78dd-3(e), 78ff(a); 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (2006). Individual violators face up to
five years in prison, fines up to $100,000 or twice the gross pecuniary gain or loss,
whichever is greater, or both a fine and imprisonment. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g),
78dd-3(e), 78ff(c); 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d). Violations of the accounting or internal con-
trol provisions carry the possibility of criminal fines up to $25 million for firms and up
to $5 million for individuals. See 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a). Individual violators further face
the possibility of imprisonment for a maximum of twenty years. See id. As with the
anti-bribery provisions, the maximum fine for either firms or individuals may be
raised to twice the gross gains or losses from the offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d).
Firms that are formally prosecuted face the risk of debarment from government con-
tracts and the imposition of injunctive remedies. Short of an actual prosecution,
word that a firm is being investigated for possible FCPA violations often leads to paral-
lel private shareholder litigation and substantial reputation loss.
42 Approximately $800 million of the settlement was paid to the United States,
with the other $800 million going to Germany. See Vardi, supra note 5, at 74.
43 See Westbrook, supra note 3, at 496 n.22.
44 Zachary A. Goldfarb, Halliburton, KBR Settle Bribery Allegations, WASH. PosT, Feb.
12, 2009, at D1.
45 Overall, the top ten FCPA settlements in terms of actual dollar amounts have
come since 2007 and total $2.8 billion. See ANDREW WEISSMAN & ALIXANDRA SMITH,
U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, RESTORING BALANCE 2 (2010).
46 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Oil Services Companies and a Freight
Forwarding Company Agree to Resolve Foreign Bribery Investigations and to Pay
More than $156 Million in Criminal Penalties (Nov. 4, 2010); Press Release, U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Snamprogetti Netherlands B.V. Resolves Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act Investigation and Agrees to Pay $240 Million Criminal Penalty (July 7, 2010) (dis-
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The enforcement trend has continued into 2011, with federal
authorities recently resolving FCPA matters with Maxwell Technolo-
gies for $14.3 million, IBM Corporation for $10 million, Tyson Foods
for $5.2 million, Rockwell Automation for $2.7 million, and Armor
Holdings for $17 million.4 7 The FCPA was also at the heart of the
much-discussed News Corporation phone-hacking scandal that domi-
nated headlines during the summer of 2011.48
Several factors explain the recent resurgence in FCPA enforce-
ment. For one, globalization is leading more firms of all sizes to pur-
sue corporate opportunities abroad. Unfortunately, many countries
that look the most attractive from a business standpoint also happen
to be the ones most plagued by corruption. Bribery is often seen as
the price for market entry in developing economies or as the only
realistic way to overcome bureaucratic inefficiencies. DOJ representa-
tives say that the agency's focus on the FCPA is driven by a desire to
"root out global corruption and preserve the integrity of the world's
cussing a $240 million criminal penalty and a disgorgement of profits of $125 mil-
lion); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Technip S.A. Resolves Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act Investigation and Agrees to Pay $240 Million Criminal Penalty (June 28,
2010) (discussing a $240 million criminal penalty and disgorgement of profits of $98
million); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Daimler AG and Three Subsidiaries
Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and Agree to Pay $93.6 Million in
Criminal Penalties (Apr. 1, 2010); see also Daniel Michaels & Cassell Bryan-Low, BAE
to Settle Bribery Cases for More than $400 Million, WALL ST.J., Feb. 6-7, 2010, at BI; Press
Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Charges Daimler AG with Global Bribery
(Apr. 1, 2010).
47 See Complaint at 1-9, SEC v. Armor Holdings, Inc., No. 1:11-cv-01271 (D.D.C.
July 13, 2011); Litig. Release No. 22037, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Files Settled
Anti-Bribery, Books and Records, and Internal Controls Charges Against Armor Hold-
ings, Inc. (July 13, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2011/
Ir22037.htm; Press Release, John Bernaden, Media Relations, Rockwell Automation,
Rockwell Automation Settles with SEC (May 3, 2011), available at http://www.reuters.
com/article/2011/05/03/idUS174137+03-May-2011+BW20110503; Litig. Release No.
21889, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, IBM to Pay $10 Million in Settled FCPA Enforce-
ment Action (Mar. 18, 2011), available at skaddenpractices.skadden.com/fcpa//
attach.php?uploadFilelD=274; Press Release, Maxwell Techs., Inc., Maxwell Technolo-
gies Settles FCPA Charges (Jan. 31, 2011), available at http://www.reuters.com/arti-
cle/2011/01/31/idUS225889+31-Jan-2011+PRN20110131; Samuel Rubenfeld, Tyson
Foods Settles FCPA Probe, Agrees to Pay $5.2 Million, WALL ST.J. (Feb. 10, 2011), http://
blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2011/02/10/tyson-foods-settles-fcpa-probe-
agrees-to-pay-52-million/.
48 SeeJamie Doward et al., Phone-Hacking Scandal: Is This the Tipping Point for Mur-
doch's Empire?, GuARDIAN (July 9, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2011/
jul/0 9 /phone-hacking-scandal-rupert-murdoch.
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markets."49 Officials from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
add that "corrupt actions hamper U.S. national security interests, for-
eign assistance goals, and the security of the United States against
transnational crime and terrorism." 0 This echoes statements made
by Mark Mendelsohn, the former head of the DOJ's FCPA enforce-
ment unit, who recently said that the upsurge in FCPA-related investi-
gations and prosecutions reflects how "corruption is a national
security issue and an impediment to security in combat areas, like Iraq
and Afghanistan."5 1
A more cynical explanation for the government's focus on the
FCPA is based on the "revolving door" between government and pri-
vate sector employment. The rise in FCPA enforcement has produced
a cottage industry of FCPA experts, including lawyers, accountants,
and consultants at prestigious firms, which DOJ and SEC personnel
often join after leaving their federal jobs for considerably higher
compensation.52
Another part of the story concerns the enactment of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) 53 in 2002 in the wake of accounting scan-
dals at Enron and other companies.5 4 SOX did many things to alter
49 Alice S. Fisher, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't ofjustice, Remarks at the Amer-
ican Bar Association National Institute on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Oct. 16,
2006), available at http://wwwjustice.gov/criminal/fraud/pr/speech/
20 06 /10-16-06
AAGFCPASpeech.pdf.
50 Keeping Foreign Corruption Out of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm.
on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 111th Cong.
3 (2010) (statement of Janice Ayala, Assistant Director, Office of Investigations, U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Department of Homeland Security), available
at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/library/speeches/ayala0
2 -04-1 0.pdf.




52 SeeVardi, supra note 5, at 72 ("[A]s the feds cranked up enforcement of the 33-
year-old Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, a thriving and lucrative anti-bribing complex
has emerged."). Similar issues have been raised in the context of the securities indus-
try. See HOMER KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE 4, 18-20 (1979); Don-
ald C. Langevoort, The SEC as a Lawmaker Choices About Investor Protection in the Face of
Uncertainty, 84 WASH. U. L. REv. 1591, 1598 (2006) (discussing a high turnover rate at
the SEC and the propensity for insiders to leave for the private sector after holding
leadership positions for a few years); Larry E. Ribstein, Agents Prosecuting Agents 13
(Univ. Ill. Program in L., Behav. and Soc. Sci., Research Paper No. LBSS11-01, 2011)
("[P]rosecutors turn up the fire so they can sell extinguishers.").
53 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C. (2006)).
54 See Westbrook, supra note 3, at 515; Timothy W. Schmidt, Note, Sweetening the
Deal: Strengthening Transnational Bribery Laws Through Standard International Corporate
Auditing Guidelines, 93 MINN. L. REv. 1120, 1133 (2009).
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the behavior of public companies, including imposing additional cer-
tification and reporting requirements. For example, SOX requires
corporate officers to certify that they have read their company's quar-
terly and annual reports, and that to the best of their knowledge, the
reports are complete and accurate and do not contain any untrue
statements.55 SOX also holds management and auditors responsible
for a company's financial reporting systems. 5 6 These developments
prompted an increasing number of firms to voluntarily disclose poten-
tial FCPA violations, which are considered "material" events under
SOX.67
The enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank)58 is expected to generate even
more evidence of potential FCPA violations. Under Dodd-Frank,
qualified whistleblowers who provide original information about
potential violations of the securities laws-which include the FCPA-
will be awarded between 10% and 30% of any monetary sanction
imposed on a firm in excess of $1 million by either the DOJ or SEC.59
In the Siemens AG case, where U.S. regulators received $800 million,
this formula would have authorized a payment of up to $240 million
to a qualified whistleblower.60
55 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7241(c), 7262 (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 1350(a) (2006).
56 See 15 U.S.C. § 7262.
57 See Bruce Hinchey, Punishing the Penitent: Disproportionate Fines in Recent FCPA
Enforcements and Suggested Improvements, 40 PUB. CONT. L.J. (forthcoming 2011) (draft
at 6) (citing Laura E. Kress, Note, How the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Has Knocked the "SOX" Off
DOJ and SEC and Kept the FCPA on Its Feet, 10 U. PITr. J. TECH. L. & PoL'v 2, 3-5
(2009)), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1650925
(discussing the reasons why companies are more likely to voluntarily disclose viola-
tions under SOX); Westbrook, supra note 3, at 516 ("SOX likely contributed to
increased information for FCPA investigations, and to companies reporting border-
line transactions rather than risk SEC discovery and investigation later.").
58 Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
59 See id. § 922(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6). The exact amount of the
reward is left to the SEC's discretion based on factors such as the significance of the
information, the degree of assistance provided, and the programmatic interest of the
government. See id. The following individuals are not eligible for a monetary reward:
(1) persons who are criminally convicted in a related action; (2) those who acquire
the information they provided through financial statement audits; and (3) persons
who fail to submit their information in a form required by the SEC, or who knowingly
provide false, fictitious, or fraudulent information. See id. The statute attempts to
protect whistleblowers by prohibiting employers from retaliating against them.
60 See Kara Scannell & Thomas Catan, U.S. Nears Deals in Bribery Case, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 15, 2010, at Bl.
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II. DEMAND-SIDE PREssuREs: THE PROBLEM OF BRIBE
SOLICITATION AND EXTORTION
The increasing pace of FCPA enforcement, as well as new regula-
tions that make discovery of potential FCPA violations more likely,
incentivizes firms to enhance their internal compliance programs to
prevent illegal payments from occurring. These programs should
help counter corruption and will hopefully lead to fewer instances of
corporate malfeasance in general.
However, despite the implementation of compliance programs,
firms doing business abroad continue to report receiving demands for
bribes-including some demands that rise to the level of extortion-
on a daily basis.6 ' These pressures make compliance a constant chal-
lenge (or "nightmare") for firms operating in markets where corrup-
tion is endemic.62
A. Nature and Frequency of Bribe Demands
Bribe demands come in a variety of forms. Some firms report
being asked to pay extra money to customs officials every time they
attempt to move goods in or out of a country.63 Others report being
asked to sponsor activities or events in a country in order to receive a
government contract, 64 or to purchase special "stamps" for employee
passports to allow them to move freely through the country's bor-
ders.65 Low-level officials in several African countries have even gone
so far as to post "fee charts" that describe how much extra companies
must pay in bribes for various routine transactions.
66
Companies also report that they frequently receive demands that
constitute extortion. Bribery and extortion are closely related. Brib-
ery refers to a corrupt payment that provides the payer with " better
than fair treatment."67 By contrast, extortion describes the request or
receipt of a corrupt benefit under a "threat to give the payer worse
61 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
62 See Letter from Francois Vincke, Chairman, Int'l Chamber of Commerce
Comm'n on Anti-Corruption, to Paul Wolfowitz, President, World Bank (Aug. 9,




63 See, e.g., Urofsky, supra note 7, at 880-81 (referencing United States v. Kay, 359
F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2004)).
64 See RESIST, supra note 7, at 33.
65 See id. at 22.
66 See ALEXANDRA ADDISON WRAGE, BRIBERY AND EXTORTION 24 (2009).
67 James Lindgren, The Theory, History, and Practice of the Bribery-Extortion Distinc-
tion, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1695, 1699 (1993) (emphasis added).
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than fair treatment."68 In the latter case the payee is guilty of extor-
tion and the payer is a victim of extortion.
Extortion in the context of international business transactions
usually comes in the form of economic extortion. This refers to a
request for payment made under a threat to the payer's existing
investment.69 It includes being asked to pay extra compensation in
order to secure a deal on previously agreed terms or to pay funds in
order to receive money that the firm is already entitled to-often with
private security guards retained by foreign officials hovering nearby to
add their own brand of motivation to the negotiations.7 0
Extortion can also mean being asked to pay fictional fines or
"surcharges" necessary to keep one's employees out of prison and able
to continue working.71 This scenario was at the center of a recent
FCPA action against NATCO Group, a Texas-based oil and gas services
company.72 According to the complaint, NATCO's wholly owned sub-
sidiary, TEST Automation & Controls, Inc., won a contract to provide
electrical services to Kazakhstan. 73 As work on the contract was under-
way, Kazakh immigration prosecutors conducted periodic audits of
the immigration documentation of TEST's expatriate workers and
claimed the TEST employees lacked proper documentation.7 4 The
prosecutors threatened to fine, jail, or deport the workers if TEST
refused to pay cash fines.75 The TEST employees believed the threats
to be genuine and sought advice from senior management in Louisi-
ana. Senior management authorized the payments and the employ-
ees used personal funds to pay $45,000 to the Kazakh prosecutors.7 6
68 Id. (emphasis added). Extortion can refer to any illegal use of threats to
obtain money, property, or an advantage from someone else. However, the more
commonly evoked usage of extortion is extortion under the color of office. In this
context, extortion refers to "the seeking or receipt of a corrupt payment by a public
official (or a pretended public official) because of his office or his ability to influence
official action." Id. at 1696.
69 See Urofsky, supra note 7, at 683.
70 See WRAGE, supra note 66, at 6; see also RESIST, supra note 7, at 38; Urofsky,
supra note 7.
71 See RESIST, supra note 7, at 22-23.
72 See GIBsoN DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, supra note 39, at 15-16; Client Memoran-
dum from Wilkie Farr & Gallagher LLP on SEC Brings FCPA Charges Based on
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The SEC acknowledged that the TEST employees were the victims of
extortion but charged NATCO with FCPA accounting violations
because the company falsely recorded the employees' reimbursement
for the ransom payments as a salary advance.7 7
The examples above aside, data on the frequency of bribe solicita-
tion and extortion can be difficult to gather since corruption typically
occurs behind closed doors. Yet NGOs and other groups dedicated to
fighting corruption have made considerable headway in this area. A
recent survey by Transparency International of more than 2,700 busi-
ness executives in twenty-six countries found that approximately 40%
of the respondents had been directly solicited to pay a bribe from tax,
customs, permitting, or other governmental authorities.7 8 This figure
rose to over 60% when the survey was confined to particular coun-
tries, such as Egypt, India, Indonesia, Morocco, Nigeria, and Pakistan,
as well as when focused on particular industries, such as the energy,
mineral resources, and telecommunications sectors.79 A narrower sur-
vey conducted in partnership with the United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime found that businesses operating in Nigeria were
requested to pay bribes in approximately 35% of transactions involv-
ing Nigerian customs officials.80 Between 25% and 40% of respon-
dents did not remember or refused to say whether they had been
solicited for a bribe.8' This suggests that the actual frequency of bribe
requests may be considerably higher than documented in the report.
77 See id. As a final example, the DOJ entered into a non-prosecution agreement
(NPA) with Alliance One International following allegations that the company vio-
lated the FCPA by making payments to tax inspectors in Kyrgyzstan who threatened to
shut down one of the company's subsidiaries. See GIBsoN, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP.,
supra note 39, at 10. The complaint and NPA are short on details, but they note that
several of the challenged payments were made "to secure [the subsidiary's] continued
ability to conduct its business in Kyrgyzstan." Letter from Denis J. McInerny, Chief,
Fraud Section, Criminal Div., to Edward J. Foth, Hunton & Williams LLP app. A at 6
(Aug. 6, 2010). This language suggests the company acted under threat of negative
economic consequences.
78 TRANSPARENCY INT'L, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2009, at 4 (2009) [hereinaf-
ter 2009 REPORT], available at http://www.transparency.org/publications/publica-
tions/globalcorruption-report/gcr2009. Executives surveyed were from the
following countries: Egypt, Ghana, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, India,
Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, France, Ger-
many, United States, and United Kingdom. Id. at 403 n.3. At least one hundred
senior executives were interviewed in each country. Id. at 403.
79 See id. at 4-5.
80 See NAT'L BUREAU OF STATISTICS ET AL. NBS/EFCC BUSINESS SURVEY ON CRIME
& CORRUPTION AND AwARENESS OF EFCC IN NIGERIA, 2007: SUMMARY REPORT 3 (2009).
81 Id.
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Anecdotally, much of the evidence on solicitation comes from
firms doing greater amounts of business in Asia, Eastern Europe, the
Middle East, and Africa. These regions account for the majority of
countries that rank lowest on Transparency International's annual
Corruption Perceptions Index-a survey indicating a perception by the
public that they are "highly corrupt."82
To help organize and expand on anecdotal accounts of bribe
demands, TRACE International, a non-profit organization that pro-
vides advice on anti-bribery compliance, has launched a project called
"BRIBEline."83 BRIBEline is an online service that allows companies
to anonymously report instances of bribe solicitation or extortion
wherever they might occur.84 After about a year TRACE publishes
data on the hundreds of calls it receives and organizes it by country.
Individual country reports then break down the information obtained
into a variety of categories: the frequency of bribe demands, the
source of the demands, and the nature of the demands. With respect
to the nature of the demands, respondents are asked whether the
bribe demand was "extortionate"-meaning that it was sought in
exchange for something the offeree was already entitled to or in
exchange for the avoidance of harm-or whether it was requested in
exchange for providing the offeree with a specific business advantage,
such as winning a government contract.85
82 See TRANSPARENCY INT'L, CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEx 2010, at 4 (2010),
available at http://www.transparency.org/policy-research/surveys-indices/cpi.
Transparency International (TI) defines corruption as the "abuse of entrusted power
for private gain." Id. This definition encompasses corrupt practices in both the pub-
lic and private sectors. Id. The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) ranks countries
according to perception of corruption in the public sector. Id. The CPI is an aggre-
gate indicator that combines different sources of information about corruption, mak-
ing it possible to compare countries. Id.
83 See BRIBELINE, https://www.bribeline.org (last visited Sept. 27, 2011).
"BRIBEline" stands for Business Registry for International Bribery and Extortion. See
id.
84 See TRACE INT'L, THE METHODOLOGICAL AND ANALYTICAL INTEGRITY OF THE
TRACE APPROACH TO COLLECTING & REPORTING INFORMATION ABOUT INTERNATIONAL
BRIBERY 1 (2007), available at https://secure.traceinternational.org/data/public/doc-
uments/Methodology-64654-1.pdf.
85 See, e.g., TRACE INT'L, BUSINESS REGISTRY FOR INTERNATIONAL BRIBERY AND
EXTORTION (BRIBELINE) 2010 BRAZIL REPORT 1 (2010) [hereinafter BRAZIL REPORT],
available at https://secure.traceinternational.org/data/public/documents/Brazil
BRIBELINEReportFINAL_000-64647-1.pdf ("Over 40% of all reported bribe demands
in Brazil were extortionate demands; that is, demands for some form of payment in
order to avoid damage to either personal or commercial interests (21%), receive
delivery of a product or service already paid for (15%) or be paid for services already
rendered (5%).").
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Though caution should be exercised when generalizing from the
BRIBEline data, the resulting reports contain a number of notable
findings. For example, between 47% and 75% of respondents report
receiving multiple bribe requests per year, with 7% to 19% saying they
received over one hundred requests. 86 Moreover, respondents from
each country surveyed report receiving a much higher percentage of
extortionate demands than bribe requests tied to the attainment of a
specific business advantage. In China, for example, 54% of the
reported demands were deemed extortionate in nature, compared to
only 32% of which were sought in exchange for granting the firm new
business or similar favorable treatment.87 The spread in the data col-
lected from Russia and Ukraine is even greater, with 60% to 63% of
respondents reporting extortionate bribe requests and only 16%
reporting requests involving the provision of a business advantage. 8
Overall, India had the most divergent split between extortionate and
non-extortionate demands, 77% to 12%, where as Brazil had the nar-
rowest, 41% to 32%.89
86 See BRAzIL REPORT, supra note 85, at 3. These reports are limited to Brazil (7/
2007 to 6/2010, 121 respondents), see id.; China (7/2007 to 6/2008, 148 respon-
dents), see TRACE INT'L, BUSINESS REGISTRY FOR INTERNATIONAL BRIBERY AND EXTOR-
TION (BRIBELINE) CHINA REPORT, 2008, at 1 (2008) [hereinafter CHINA REPORT],
available at https://secure.traceinternational.org/data/public/documents/China-PR
_andReport-64652-1.pdf; India (7/2007 to 10/2008, ninety-six respondents), see
TRACE INT'L, BUSINESS REGISTRY FOR INTERNATIONAL BRIBERY AND EXTORTION (BRIBE-
LINE) INDIA REPORT, 2009, at 1 (2009) [hereinafter INDIA REPORT], available at https:/
/secure.traceinternational.org/data/public/documents/IndiaReportPressKitO 11009-
64642-1.pdf; Mexico (7/2007 to 1/2010, 151 respondents), see TRACE INT'L, BUSINESS
REGISTRY FOR INTERNATIONAL BRIBERY AND EXTORTION (BRIBELINE) 2010 MEXICO
REPORT 3 (2010) [hereinafter MEXICO REPORT], available at https://secure.traceinter-
national.org/data/public/documents/201OMexicoBRIBElineReport-
64 590-1.pdf;
Russia (7/2007 to 12/2008, 286 respondents), see TRACE INT'L, BUSINESS REGISTRY
FOR INTERNATIONAL BRIBERY AND EXTORTION (BRIBELINE) 2009 RuSSIA REPORT 1
(2009) [hereinafter RUSSIA REPORT], available at https://secure.traceinternational.
org/data/public/documents/BRIBElineRussiaReport_2009-6465
0-I.pdf; Ukraine (7/
2007 to 11/2009, 169 respondents), see TRACE INT'L, BUSINESS REGISTRY FOR INTERNA-
TIONAL BRIBERY AND EXTORTION (BRIBELINE) 2009 UKRAINE REPORT 2 (2009) [herein-
after UKRAINE REPORT], available at https://secure.traceinternational.org/data/
public/documents/BRIBElineUkraine-64618-1.pdf. This data further reveals that the
percentage of bribe demands from government officials ranges from 81% to 92%. See
BRAZIL REPORT, supra note 85; CHINA REPORT, supra; INDIA REPORT, supra; MEXICO
REPORT, supra; RUSSIA REPORT, supra; UKRAINE REPORT, supra.
87 CHINA REPORT, supra note 86, at 3 Chart 4. The remaining percentage of
reported bribe demands fell in an undefined category. Id.
88 UKRAINE REPORT, supra note 86, at 2.
89 BRAZIL REPORT, supra note 85, at 2.
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Of course, a limitation of this data is that it depends on voluntary
responses and only reflects one side of the story. The data does not
reveal any information about the frequency with which firms may first
solicit potential bribe-takers in an effort to secure a business advan-
tage. It is certainly conceivable that firms would be quicker to report
extortionate demands than they would be to report their own
attempts to use bribery to win contracts. Nevertheless, the data pro-
vides a useful glimpse into the dynamic that firms face with respect to
solicitation/extortion.
B. Costs
Frequent bribe demands of all types impose a variety of costs on
firms and other market participants. At a minimum, the need to
respond to demands raises transaction costs.90 These costs include
spending additional time to address requests for payments that come
outside of normal, legal channels-which may involve repeated meet-
ings with the foreign official requesting payment-as well as addi-
tional expenditures on lawyers or other advisors brought in to assist in
such situations. The latter expenditures will be particularly important
so that firms can adequately evaluate the nature of the foreign offi-
cial's demand or implement procedures to avoid or negate threats.
Ordinarily, and setting aside possible sanctions under the FCPA, a
rational firm will acquiesce to economic extortion as long as the
amount of the payment does not exceed the harm that it would suffer
if the threat is executed.91 However, if the firm acts on imperfect or
misunderstood information regarding the credibility of the threat, it
may reject a demand only to see the threat carried out and a loss
suffered.
Solicitation and extortion also reduce the incentives for firms to
do business in particular countries where bribe demands are com-
mon. One way to avoid losses is to minimize one's vulnerability to
those who do the threatening.92 In the case of economic extortion
90 See FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING 33-34 (1997) (discussing
increased transaction costs relating to extortion including disincentives for future
investment, diminished value of existing investment, social costs, and the dead weight
of hidden resources); WRAGE, supra note 66, at 70 (illustrating prolonged negotia-
tions and damage to corporate culture as examples of the transaction costs of
extortion).
91 See Steven Shavell, An Economic Analysis of Threats and Their Illegality, 141 U. PA.
L. REV. 1877, 1882-83 (1993).
92 See MCCHESNEY, supra note 90, at 33 ("One way of minimizing loss by theft is to
have little or nothing to steal. In a world in which theft was legal we could expect this
fact to lead to a reduction in productive activities." (quoting Gordon Tullock, The
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abroad, this means reducing commercial activity in areas where
threats are viewed as routine or as simply a cost of doing business.
This could be good or bad, depending on the social value created by
commercial activity taking place within a particular country or
region.9
If a firm remains in an area with widespread passive corruption,
and if the expected cost of the action threatened by a foreign official
exceeds the value of what the firm must pay to avoid the conse-
quences of the threat, the firm will be acting rationally if it makes the
requested payment in order to avoid future losses. 94 However, this
too will have negative repercussions. For consumers and end-users of
a firm's goods or services, the cost of the corrupt payment will now be
reflected in higher selling prices. Consumers are then left to
"purchase alternative goods that they do not really prefer and which
are not really cheaper but only appear so because of the high extor-
tion-related price of goods sold by extorted merchants."9 5
The willingness of a firm to acquiesce to one demand for pay-
ment can further spawn additional demands, which will then lead to
continued costs and complications as the firm becomes "the goose
that lays the golden eggs" for a particular foreign official or group of
officials.96 Moreover, persistent threats can create fear and anxiety for
a firm's agents and employees.9 7
If alternative markets exist where solicitation or extortion is less
of a problem, firms facing bribe demands may elect to move to those
areas. Yet, it will often be unclear whether such a move would be
more socially valuable for the countries involved-as opposed to sim-
ply being more practical for the firm-and the costs involved with
relocation will be borne by shareholders and end-users of the firm's
goods or services.98
Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224, 229 n.11 (1967)));
Shavell, supra note 91, at 1879-80.
93 See Shavell, supra note 91, at 1894.
94 See MCCHESNEY, supra note 90, at 22. This calculation could change depending
on how a firm assesses the probability of future demands and the expected losses
from those future demands.
95 Shavell, supra note 91, at 1897.
96 See id. at 1886, 1888-89; see also WRAGE, supra note 66, at 31 ("Each time a
businessman responds to a demand with payment, he paves the way for the creation
of new and higher hurdles which he will have to buy his way past.").
97 See Shavell, supra note 91, at 1894, 1897.
98 See MCCHESNEY, supra note 90, at 33. Of course one final negative conse-
quence associated with economic and other forms of extortion would result if a threat
is carried out following non-payment of a demanded sum. See Shavell, supra note 91,
at 1895.
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C. Incongruity of the FCPA and Other International
Anti-Bribery Instruments
The FCPA suffers from an inherent incongruity that prevents it
from fully addressing the foregoing costs associated with solicitation
and extortion. To explain, it is first useful to recognize that the cor-
ruption literature breaks down bribery transactions into two parts:
active bribery and passive bribery. Active bribery refers to the "supply"
side of the deal and is defined as the payment of a bribe.99 On the
demand side, passive bribery occurs when a government official solic-
its or accepts a bribe.100 As shown above, the FCPA's extraterritorial
reach extends only to active bribery-it prohibits the payment of
bribes but does not cover the request for or receipt of a bribe by a
foreign official.10
99 See Patrick X. Delaney, Transnational Corruption, 47 VA. J. INT'L L. 413, 422-23
(2007); Susan Rose-Ackerman, The Law and Economics of Bribery and Extortion, 6 ANN.
REv. L. & Soc. Sci. 217, 222 (2010); see also Corruption Glossary, U4 ANTI-CORRUPTION
RESOURCE CENTRE, http://www.04.no/document/glossary.cfm (last visited Oct. 14,
2011). The Criminal Law Convention on Corruption of the Council of Europe
defines "active bribery" as "the promising, offering or giving by any person, directly or
indirectly, of any undue advantage [to any public official], for himself or herself or
for anyone else, for him or her to act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or
her functions." Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, art.2, opened for signature
Jan. 27, 1999, E.T.S. No. 173.
100 The Criminal Law Convention on Corruption of the Council of Europe
defines "passive bribery" as the "request or receipt [by any public official], directly or
indirectly, of any undue advantage, for himself or herself or for anyone else, or the
acceptance of an offer or a promise of such an advantage, to act or refrain from
acting in the exercise of his or her functions." Criminal Law Convention on Corrup-
tion, supra note 99, at art. 3. Despite using the term "passive" to refer to the conduct
of the bribee, neither side is truly passive since both the briber and bribee must agree
before a bribe can occur. When a foreign official pressures the briber, she is arguably
the more active of the two parties. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 99, at 222. The
commentary to the OECD Convention Against Corruption provides as follows:
The Convention does not utilise the term "active bribery" simply to avoid it
being misread by the non-technical reader as implying that the briber has
taken the initiative and the recipient is a passive victim. In fact, in a number
of situations, the recipient will have induced or pressured the briber and will
have been, in that sense, the more active.
Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Commentaries on the Convention on Combating
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions 1 1, Nov.
21, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 14 [hereinafter OECD Commentaries].
101 See supra Part I.A. Most domestic anti-bribery laws recognize the two-sided
nature of corruption and criminalize both active and passive bribery. For example, in
the United States, 18 U.S.C. § 201 penalizes both active and passive bribery. See 18
U.S.C. § 201 (2006).
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Most other international anti-bribery instruments follow a similar
approach. For example, the 1997 Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development's Convention Against Corruption encour-
ages signatories to enact domestic laws that will criminalize the
payment of bribes to foreign officials when done in connection with
international business transactions. 1 0 2 Like the FCPA, it focuses solely
on the supply side of transnational bribery: it does not require signato-
ries to criminalize the bribery of their own public officials, nor does it
apply to purely domestic bribery or bribery involving non-public
officials.103
Another prominent piece of legislation modeled after the FCPA
is the recently enacted United Kingdom Bribery Act of 2010 (Bribery
Act). The Bribery Act received Royal Assent on April 8, 2010 and
went into effect on July 1, 2011.104 It is intended to consolidate the
United Kingdom's law on the subject of bribery, which had been pre-
viously described by Transparency International as "ineffective and
out-of-date."10 5 Structurally, the Bribery Act closely tracks the FCPA
and the OECD and its extraterritorial provisions prohibit the payment
of bribes to foreign officials in order to obtain a commercial advan-
102 See Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Interna-
tional Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter OECD Anti-Brib-
ery Convention]. The OECD Convention has been adopted and ratified by thirty-
eight countries. The OECD consists of thirty-four of world trade and investment
member states that collectively represent over 80% of the world trade and investment.
See id.
103 The OECD Convention requires signatories to adopt agreements to prosecute
or extradite nationals who are accused by another signatory of bribery, as well as to
force companies to implement accounting and internal control provisions incidental
to the bribery restrictions. See id. In 2009 the OECD Council adopted two additional
measures. See Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Recommendation of the Council
for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, Nov. 26, 2009, 37 I.L.M. 20 [hereinafter OECD Reporting Recommen-
dation]; Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Recommendation of the Council on
Tax Measures for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International
Business Transactions, May 25, 2009, 37 I.L.M. 33 [hereinafter OECD Tax Recom-
mendation]. One urges signatories to affirmatively disallow tax deductions for bribes.
See OECD Tax Recommendation, supra. The other recommends measures related to
the reporting of foreign bribery. See OECD Reporting Recommendation, supra.
104 See U.K. Anti-Bribery Act to Be Effective in July; Business Guidance Published, Sec. L.
Daily (BNA) (March 31, 2011).
105 Client Memorandum Wilkie Farr & Gallagher LLP on Recent Enforcement
Actions by U.K. Serious Fraud Office and Introduction of New U.K. Bribery Bill in
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tage. A person violates this provision if she offers, promises, or gives,
directly or indirectly, a financial or other advantage to a foreign pub-
lic official, with the intent to influence that foreign public official in
her official capacity and to obtain or retain business. The Bribery Act
also holds companies strictly liable if they fail to prevent a bribe. The
only way firms can avoid liability for the failure to prevent bribes is if
they successfully demonstrate that they had "adequate procedures" in
place designed to prevent misconduct at the time that the alleged vio-
lation occurred. 06
The one major player in the international community to take a
different approach is the United Nations, which, in 2005, authored
the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC). The
UNCAC has been ratified by 122 of its 140 signatories.1 0 7 Like the
FCPA and OEDC, it prohibits bribes to foreign government officials.
However, the UNCAC also includes an optional provision that encour-
ages signatories to adopt legislation prohibiting passive bribery and
extortion in the public and private sectors. 08
So far no signatories have implemented the UNCAC's optional
provision on passive bribery. This is likely explained by the same rea-
sons that led Congress to forgo any attempt at regulating passive brib-
ery under the FCPA. For one, the FCPA's exclusive focus on active
bribery allows regulators to avoid the diplomatic and jurisdictional
complications that would undoubtedly accompany any attempt to
directly prosecute foreign officials who solicit or receive bribes. State
actor defendants may seek sovereign immunity under the U.S. For-
eign Sovereign Immunities Act, or they may invoke the act of state
106 See id. at 3.
107 See United Nations Convention Against Corruption Participants, UNITED NATIONS
TREATY COLLECTION (Oct. 14, 2011, 7:25 AM), http://treaties.un.org/pages/view
details.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mtdsg no=XVIII-14&chapter=18&lang=en
#Participants.
108 See Philippa Webb, The United Nations Convention Against Corruption, 8 J. INT'L
ECON. L. 191, 210 (2005). Other international anti-corruption instruments include
conventions adopted by the Organization of American States (OAS), the European
Union, and the African Union. See id. at 198-203. The OAS Convention has been
signed by twenty-two countries, including the United States, and covers a greater
range of conduct than the OECD Convention or FCPA. See id. at 193-94; List of Signa-
tories to the Inter American Convention Against Corruption, ORG. Am. STs. http://www.oas.
org/juridico/english/sigs/b-58.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2011). For example, it rec-
ommends that both transnational and domestic bribery be criminalized. See Webb,
supra, at 194. On the domestic front this includes the criminalization of active and
passive bribery, but its provisions on transnational bribery are limited to active bribery
only. See id. The anti-corruption conventions by the European Union and African
Union both only extend to active bribery.
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doctrine or the political question doctrine. Congress was also aware
when it passed the FCPA that nearly every country has domestic laws
in place that prohibit public officials from taking bribes, perhaps mak-
ing the consideration of passive bribery by U.S. authorities seem
superfluous. 09
These reasons might explain why the FCPA and other instru-
ments fail to address bribe solicitation and extortion, but they do not
provide much comfort to firms doing business abroad. Regulators'
inability to impose criminal sanctions on corrupt foreign officials
means that little is done to curb the market for bribery on the
demand side. Domestic authorities in the developing world are rarely
able to pick up the slack in this regard because in many countries the
prosecution of government officials who solicit or receive bribes is lax
due to overburdened prosecutors, lack of resources, weak legislation,
or the failure or inability to devise appropriate strategies for interdic-
tion.110 In others, the problem of under-enforcement is more troub-
ling because it stems from corrupt influences on or within the
relevant governmental authorities."' Foreign officials who contem-
plate asking firms for bribes in connection with a business transaction
will naturally weigh their self-interests against the probability of being
penalized. If the demand-side regulation of bribery is reserved to host
countries, and if that regulation is ineffective, then the payoff calculus
performed by corrupt officials will often come out in favor of solicita-
tion or extortion.112
D. FCPA Enforcement in Cases of Solicitation and Extortion
Even though the DOJ and SEC cannot use the FCPA to target the
demand side of corruption, they have clearly indicated through their
enforcement patterns that solicitation or extortion is no excuse for
109 See United States v. Castle, 925 F.2d 831, 835 (5th Cir. 1991) ("Further mini-
mizing the deterrent value of a U.S. prosecution was the fact that many foreign
nations already prohibited the receipt of a bribe by an official.").
110 SeeJohn Brademas & Fritz Heimann, Tackling International Corruption, 77 FOR-
EIGN AFF. 17, 19 (1998); Robert Klitgaard, International Cooperation Against Corruption,
35 FIN. & DEV. 3, 3 (1998).
111 Brademas & Heimann, supra note 110, at 21; Philip M. Nichols, Regulating
Transnational Bribery in Times of Globalization and Fragmentation, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 257,
283 (1999). Nichols writes that "[c]orrupt environments tend to drive out honest
bureaucrats, leaving only those who engage in bribe-taking. Indeed, in some corrupt
systems positions within the bureaucracy are illicitly sold by superiors, thus effectively
screening out those whose integrity would disallow the payment of bribes." Id.
112 Klitgaard, supra note 110, at 4 ("[W]hen bribes are large, the chances of being
caught small, and the penalties if caught meager, many officials will succumb.").
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paying bribes. One example can be found in the DOJ's "Catch-22"
operation from January 2010. In that case, federal authorities
indicted and arrested twenty-two executives in the arms industry fol-
lowing the first undercover sting operation ever aimed at violations of
the FCPA." 3 All but one of the arrests took place in Las Vegas, where
most of the defendants were attending the SHOT Show-billed as the
world's premier weapons and firearms trade show." 4 None of the
defendants lived in Las Vegas, however, and all of the criminal
charges related to conduct that purportedly occurred several months
earlier at two luxury hotels in Miami and Washington, D.C.'1 5 Over
several days at these hotels, two people claiming to represent the
defense minister of Gabon solicited the defendants for bribes.' 16 In
fact, the two "representatives" were FBI special agents working under-
cover." 7 The agents told the defendants that they would need to pay
a twenty percent commission to a fictional sales agent-half of which
would then go directly into the defense minister's own personal
account as a bribe-in order to receive lucrative contracts to supply
the Gabonese presidential guard with munitions.118 The indictments
further allege that the defendants agreed to this arrangement, with
some going so far as to perform a test transaction to reassure the
defense minister that the transfer of funds could go through as
planned.1 9
Assuming that the allegations in the SHOT Show indictments are
true, this case clearly falls within the FCPA's prohibition on active
bribery regardless of the fact that the defendants did not initiate the
bribe payments directly. Congress was fully aware that bribes may be
demanded as price for gaining market entry or as a price for
obtaining government contracts. It noted, however, that "at some
point the U.S. company would make a conscious decision whether or
not to pay a bribe."120 The limited exceptions and affirmative
113 See GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, 2010 MID-YEAR FCPA UPDATE (2010),
available at http://www.gibsondunn.com/Publications/Pages/201OMid-YearFCPAUp
date.aspx.
114 Diana B. Henriques, F.B.I Snares Weapons Executives in Bribery Sting, N.Y. TIMES,




118 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Twenty-Two Executives and Employees
of Military and Law Enforcement Products Companies Charged in Foreign Bribery
Scheme (Jan. 19, 2010), available at http://wwwjustice.gov/opa/pr/2010/January/
10-crm-048.html.
119 See id.
120 S. REP. No. 95-114, at 10 (1977).
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defenses to the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions thus do not excuse
bribes on the grounds that they were paid only after first being
demanded by foreign officials.
In one sense this approach reflects a logical enforcement strat-
egy. Not all bribery cases feature the straightforward quid pro quo
arrangement found in the SHOT Show case. Many corrupt officials
drop hints that bribes would move things along without ever explicitly
asking for payment.121 In other cases, it will be known in the local
business community that no business can happen without a bribe.
122
In these situations it is not always clear which parties committed active
versus passive bribery. If bribery is seen as a "cost of doing business"
in Country X, is providing an envelope of cash to a foreign official an
offer to bribe or a response to a bribe request? Though it takes two to
tango, bribery rarely consists of formal offers, counteroffers, and
negotiations. It is often subtle, and solicitations and offers can start to
look quite similar from both a normative and economic perspec-
tive.123 Practically speaking it would be difficult, if not impossible, to
use the FCPA to combat corporate corruption abroad if the statute's
drafters tried to make clear distinctions between active and passive
bribery in order to penalize only those firms that expressly initiate
bribe offers.
However, one lingering issue with the FCPA's approach is that it
can often appear to put firms in untenable or unfair positions pre-
cisely because of the hazy lines between active bribery and passive
bribery. For example, should firms also be held liable under the
FCPA if they fall victim to extortionate threats? Or should they be
liable in cases where the subtleties and vagaries of bribe solicitation
make it unclear whether an agent who paid money to a foreign official
actually intended for the payment to serve as a "bribe" (as opposed to
serving as a gift or some other less obviously corrupt purpose)? So far
federal regulators have answered both questions in the affirmative.
12 4
Firms are therefore encouraged to develop strategies for resisting
bribe demands regardless of the form they take or how unfair firms
think the imposition of liability would be. Yet, as discussed in the next
121 WRAGE, supra note 66, at 10 ("Officials ... do not ask for money outright.
Instead, they stage a scene in which the company representatives, attuned to the sig-
nals being sent after years of doing business in the region, will know what is expected
of them.").
122 See id. at 6.
123 See id. at 10-11. My thanks to Professor Urska Velikonja for sharing similar
observations based on her time practicing law in Eastern Europe.
124 See infra text accompanying notes 157-164.
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section, developing efficient compliance programs to deal with bribe
demands has proven increasingly problematic.
III. GOVERNANCE AND COMPLIANCE CHALLENGES
Several suggestions have been offered to help firms resist bribe
demands. For instance, firms have been encouraged to ask foreign
officials if they would be willing to allow an independent consultant
(such as a law firm or representative from the World Bank) to serve as
a supervisor during all negotiations, 1 2 5 or if they would agree to insert
anti-bribery clauses in all potential contracts.12 6 Other ideas include
asking foreign officials to reduce any unusual payment requests to
writing, as well as bringing such requests to the attention of the offi-
cials' superiors, the firms' own compliance officers, or local business
associations. 127
These strategies might very well help firms reduce their exposure
to solicitation and extortion. However, two issues remain that make
compliance a persistent challenge: (1) the unique practical complexi-
ties that firms face when doing business abroad; and (2) the expansive
approach to statutory interpretation that the DOJ and SEC often take
when enforcing the FCPA.
A. Practical Issues
Doing business abroad is quite different from doing business
domestically because overseas markets often feature unfamiliar laws
and customs. This leads transnational firms to depend heavily on the
use of specialized local agents and intermediaries. In fact, frequently
the first step taken by a firm considering a project in another country
is to engage a foreign third party as its agent to help navigate the
particular nuances of the market. 128 Hiring an agent/specialist may
even be a legal requirement for doing business in certain countries,
particularly in the Middle East.129 In other countries, it is a de facto
requirement in the sense that local agents provide firms with their
only hope of complying with a complex set of location-specific rules,
125 WRAGE, supra note 66, at 17.
126 See RESIST, supra note 7, at 8.
127 See id. at 39, 48.
128 See Mike Koehler, The FCPA, Foreign Agents, and Lessons from the Halliburton
Enforcement Action, 36 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 457, 459 (2010). These agents and
intermediaries work in a variety of fields. Some simply fill the roles of consultant or
go-between; others play important roles in the supply chain as distributors or resel-
lers. Id. at 457, n.3.
129 See id. at 459.
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regulations, and cultural norms.o30 The use of foreign agents also
allows firms to enter new markets without needing to go to the
expense of actually establishing a local office with local employees. 13'
In the FCPA context, the use of specialized agents or
intermediaries takes on particular significance due to principles of
vicarious liability. Vicarious liability can arise under the FCPA in two
situations. The first involves the statute's third-party liability provi-
sions. Pursuant to these provisions, any covered person under the
statute is prohibited from providing anything of value to a person
while knowing that all or at least a part of it will be given directly or
indirectly to a foreign official for the purpose of obtaining or retain-
ing business. The required mens rea for this provision is broad. A
firm will be liable for violations caused by its agent if it is aware that
the agent is "engaging in such conduct, that such circumstance exists,
or that such result is substantially certain to occur"; or if it has "a firm
belief that such circumstance exists or that such result is substantially
certain to occur."' 3 2 In addition, knowledge is established when a
firm is aware "of a high probability of the existence of such circum-
stance, unless [it] actually believes that such circumstance does not
exist," as well as when a firm consciously disregards facts that an agent
may act in such a way.' 3 3
The second principle of vicarious liability often implicated in
FCPA actions is the common law doctrine of respondeat superior.
This doctrine provides that firms may be held liable for the actions of
their agents where the agents' actions were committed with the scope
of employment and done at least in part to serve the firm's inter-
ests.134 The consequences of respondeat superior can be severe: "If a
single employee, however low down in the corporate hierarchy, com-
mits a crime in the course of his or her employment, even in part to
benefit the corporation, the corporate employer is criminally liable
130 See id. ("Use of foreign agents is particularly strong in high-growth markets,
such as China and India, where understanding and navigating through complex
bureaucracies is often a key ingredient to business success.").
131 See WRAGE, supra note 66, at 12-13.
132 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f) (2006).
133 Id. Unlike the U.K. Bribery Act, the third-party liability provisions of the FCPA
do not allow firms to cite the existence of an internal compliance program as a
defense. Compliance programs typically become relevant, if at all, only in the settle-
ment or sentencing phases.
134 See Frank C. Razzano & Travis P. Nelson, The Expanding Criminalization of Trans-
national Bribery: Global Prosecution Necessitates Global Compliance, 42 INT'L LAw. 1259,
1275-76 (2008).
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for that employee's crime."135 This is true regardless of whether the
agent acted contrary to express instructions, even when the instruc-
tions were part of a larger firm compliance program. 36
Enforcement actions against all corporations are based on princi-
ples of vicarious liability since firms can only act by and through their
agents. In the FCPA setting, however, the risk of vicarious liability is
amplified in markets where bribe demands or extortionate threats are
common. It is usually a firm's agents on the front lines who will first
face these demands.' 37 Due to competitive pressures, and in order to
serve the interests of their clients who are seeking to operate in these
and other countries, foreign agents and intermediaries are often put
in the position where acquiescence to bribe demands seems like the
only option.
Similar issues arise with respect to a firm's own employees.
Employees doing business in countries with widespread corruption
frequently discover that bribery is seen as necessary to gain market
entry or to overcome problems presented by stalled bureaucracies.
These issues raise an additional layer of complexity due to the respon-
sibility of firms to serve the financial interests of their shareholders.
Firms are not monoliths. They have multiple moving parts, each with
different perspectives and goals. 13 8 On the one hand, firms are
encouraged by extraterritorial anti-bribery laws like the FCPA to do
whatever they can to prevent their employees from engaging in cor-
rupt transactions with foreign officials. On the other, these same
employees are routinely incentivized to act in the best financial inter-
ests of the corporation. 13 9 If employees believe that bribery is a neces-
135 Mary Jo White, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Has Gone Wrong? 1517 PLI/
Corp. 815, 817 (2005). Ms. White is a former U.S. Attorney.
136 See id.
137 This is especially true in the extractive industries, where the need to work with
available resources leads firms to countries that rank among the most corrupt accord-
ing to Transparency International's World Index of Corruption Perceptions. Accord-
ing to the chief compliance officer at Weatherford International Ltd., "[T]he biggest
challenge or risk for many, if not all oil and gas companies, will always be with respect
to third parties and intermediaries acting on a company's behalf in dealing with cov-
ered persons. We all do business in the 'high risk' countries with reputations for
corruption and we're all somewhat reliant on sales agents, consultants and brokers in
many of these countries. Many of the DOJ and SEC FCPA settlements we hear about
started because of some bad act or acts by an agent of that company." Interview with
Adrian Mebane, Dir. of the Ethics and Compliance Group, Weatherford Int'l Ltd. (on
file with author).
138 See I AAYREs &JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION 80 (1992).
139 See id. at 19 (noting that "[b]usiness executives have profit-maximizing selves
and law-abiding selves, at different moments, in different contexts, the different selves
prevail").
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sary part of doing business and serving shareholder interests, the
temptation to give into bribe demands will be considerable.
To be sure, firms can implement a variety of governance strate-
gies to reduce their exposure to vicarious liability in cases of solicita-
tion or extortion. They can provide agents with monetary incentives
designed to ensure compliance, expand existing monitoring efforts,
and restrict agents' ability to make decisions on behalf of the firm.1
40
However, these measures will rarely provide firms with complete pro-
tection from liability. Agency costs within firms are never zero
because agents' incentives are never perfectly aligned with the inter-
ests of their principals. 141 This often causes agents to disregard inter-
nal firm policies and instructions if doing so will serve their own
financial interests. In several FCPA cases, firms have been prosecuted
where the employees responsible for the alleged violations acted con-
trary to well-documented FCPA compliance policies and had previ-
ously participated in extensive FCPA compliance training.
Agents in the FCPA context-and especially foreign agents-also
frequently employ a variety of tools to conceal bribes to public offi-
cials. For example, agents routinely attempt to hide bribes by disguis-
ing them in underlying documentation as "service fees," "facilitation
fees," or "commissions." 142 Bribe-seeking officials in some countries,
including China, have actually helped agents conceal bribes from
their firms by creating subsidiary agencies that then charge fees for
the agent's ability to interact with primary agencies. 143 In other situa-
tions, firms may be unable to discover that government officials have
ownership interests in the agent enterprises they hired or that individ-
ual agents have family ties to particular government officials.
144 Firms
subject to the FCPA devote considerable resources to vetting potential
agents, but even the best firms can miss red flags when agents go to
great lengths to hide their tracks.1 45
140 See generally Ribstein, supra note 52 (evaluating incentives involved with the
prosecution of corporate crimes).
141 See id. at 8.
142 See Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the Ultimate Year of Its Decade
of Resurgence, 43 IND. L. REv. 389, 400, 403 (2010); see also 2009 REPORT, supra note 78,
at 60.
143 See Steven R. Salbu, A Delicate Balance: Legislation, Institutional Change, and
Transnational Bribery, 33 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 657, 686 (2000).
144 See WRAGE, supra note 66, at 13.
145 See id. These issues are not limited to agents retained by large, transnational
corporations. Increased globalization and domestic market saturation has caused
firms of all sizes to consider entering foreign markets. Exposure to liability under
statutes like the FCPA can be especially problematic for small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs). SMEs doing business in foreign countries often lack the
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B. Expansive and Aggressive Statutory Interpretation
Another factor contributing to FCPA compliance challenges is
the way that regulators now interpret and apply several of the FCPA's
key provisions. The DOJ and SEC have become more expansive in
their interpretation of the FCPA anti-bribery provisions and consider-
ably narrower in their assessment of the statute's exceptions and
defenses.
Much of the trouble in this regard comes because the govern-
ment's authority under the FCPA is not as broad as the recent resur-
gence in enforcement activity might suggest. The FCPA expressly
permits at least four types of payments: (1) payments that are not "cor-
rupt"; (2) payments that are not made for the purpose of obtaining or
retaining business; (3) payments that facilitate routine government
action; and (4) payments that go to someone other than a foreign
official.146 Many payments made in response to bribe demands or
extortionate threats arguably fall within one or more of these "pro-
tected" categories. However, regulators have taken an increasingly
aggressive and uneven approach to interpreting them.
1. The Meaning of "Corrupt" and the FCPA's Business Nexus
Requirement
To be liable under the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions a defendant
must act with the requisite intent. This means a defendant's chal-
lenged payment must have been both (1) corrupt and (2) made for
the purpose of "obtaining or retaining business for or with, or
directing business to, any person."' 4 7 Neither prong is defined in the
resources and expertise to effectively resist solicitation for bribes. Like their larger
counterparts, SMEs are under considerable financial pressure and may feel that brib-
ery is their only path to economic survival. See 2009 REPORT, supra note 78, at 24-25
("What can an SME do to avoid bribery when a customs official demands a bribe in
order to allow the import of a perishable product? Where can a supplier get help
when the buyer for a major retailer expects 'encouragement' when awarding con-
tracts?"). SMEs also frequently operate in developing or transitional economies, and
often serve as links in the chain of supply with larger firms. This makes SMEs espe-
cially vulnerable to bribe solicitation and extortion. See id. (noting that at least one
study cited by TI suggests that corruption is a greater impediment to the business of
SMEs than large corporations in light of SMEs position in supply chains).
146 The FCPA also permits payments for bona fide promotion expenses. See 15
U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c) (2) (2006).
147 Id. §§ 78dd-1 (a), 78dd-2 (a), 78dd-3(a). The U.K. Bribery Act similarly prohib-
its bribes to foreign officials that are made in order "to obtain or retain business or an
advantage in the conduct of business." MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, CONSULTATION ON Gui-
DANCE ABOUT COMMERCIAL ORGANISATIONS PREVENTING BRIBERY 19 (2010).
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statute. The FCPA's legislative history says that a "corrupt" payment is
one that was intended to induce the recipient to misuse her official
position to wrongfully direct business to the payer. 14 8 This definition
has received judicial support and is used by the DOJ in its Criminal
Resource Manual (which guides prosecutorial discretion) .149 It is also
consistent with how other international anti-bribery instruments
define the term corrupt.1 5 0
The second prong-"obtain or retain business"-is typically
described as the FCPA's business nexus requirement.'5 1 Though long
considered vague, the Fifth Circuit appeared to clarify this require-
ment in its 2004 decision in United States v. Kay.15 2 In that case, the
court considered whether payments to foreign officials for the pur-
pose of avoiding customs duties or receiving lower sales taxes satisfied
the necessary business nexus. The court held that these payments
could assist in obtaining business, and therefore allowed the case to
proceed. 5 3 However, the court added that not all such payments are
unlawful: "We hasten to add ... [that] [i]t still must be shown that the
bribery was intended to produce an effect-here, through tax sav-
ings-that would 'assist in obtaining or retaining business.' "1
54
In a lengthy but important passage the court continued:
Although we recognize that lowering tax and customs payments pre-
sumptively increases a company's profit margin by reducing its cost
of doing business, it does not follow, ipso facto . .. that such a result
satisfies the statutory business nexus element. Even a modest imagi-
nation can hypothesize myriad ways that an unwarranted reduction
in duties and taxes . . . could assist in obtaining or retaining busi-
ness. .. . [B]ut that is not to say that such a diminution always assists
in obtaining or retaining business. There are bound to be circum-
stances in which a cost reduction does nothing other than increase
the profitability of an already-profitable venture. . . . Indeed, if the
government is correct that anytime operating costs are reduced the
148 See United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 749 n.40 (5th Cir. 2004). The Eighth
Circuit has applied a different definition of "corrupt" in the FCPA setting, saying that
the term means conduct that is "voluntarily [a]nd intentionally, and with a bad pur-
pose of accomplishing either an unlawful end or result, or a lawful end or result by
some unlawful method or means." See United States v. Liebo, 923 F.2d 1308, 1312
(8th Cir. 1991) (alteration in original) (quoting trial court's jury instructions).
149 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL § 1018 (2000), available at
http:www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/Foia-readingroom/usam/title9/crimOO00.htm.
150 See, e.g., OECD Commentaries, supra note 100, 1 1.
151 See Kay, 359 F.3d at 740.
152 See id.
153 Id. at 740.
154 Id. at 756.
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beneficiary of such advantage is assisted in getting or keeping busi-
ness, the FCPA's language that expresses the necessary element of
assisting is [sic] obtaining or retaining business would be unneces-
sary, and thus surplusage-a conclusion that we are forbidden to
reach.' 5 5
Taken together, the requirement that a payment be made cor-
ruptly and with a business nexus raises several issues in FCPA cases
involving demand-side corruption. On one hand, cases that involve
straightforward bribe solicitation, like the SHOT Show operation
mentioned earlier, should not pose much difficulty under either the
corrupt intent or business nexus requirements. In the SHOT Show
case, the defendants were allegedly told in no uncertain terms that
disguised side payments to an agent for the Gabonese defense minis-
ter were necessary to win government contracts.156 Assuming the facts
at trial support these allegations, it will be hard for the defendants to
argue that they did not appreciate the corrupt nature of the transac-
tion nor the business advantage that the bribes would provide.
However, matters become murkier in cases involving extortion.
In situations that involve "true extortion"-defined as payments made
under threat of serious bodily harm-the FCPA's legislative history
suggests that firms are entitled to a defense. Congress noted that
these cases do not implicate the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions
because payments "to an official to keep an oil rig from being dyna-
mited [are not] made with the requisite corrupt purpose."15 7 This
reasoning clearly follows from the FCPA's plain language. A payment
to an official designed to prevent the bombing of one's property
would hardly be intended to induce that official to misuse her posi-
tion to "wrongfully" direct business to that payer. The payment in this
hypothetical would be made simply to keep everything in one piece.
The law is considerably less clear in cases involving economic
extortion. As the BRIBEline data shows, firms report receiving extor-
tionate threats of an economic nature much more often than threats
of physical injury.15 8 This is an important issue for firms because U.S.
authorities have demonstrated a willingness to bring FCPA charges
based on payments made to protect existing investments. For exam-
ple, in 2010, the SEC charged Joe Summers, a former employee of
Pride International, with violating the FCPA after he paid $30,000 to
155 Id. at 759-60.
156 See Henriques, supra note 114.
157 S. REP. No. 95-114, at 11 (1977).
158 See BRIBEline, supra note 83.
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Venezuela's state-owned oil company (PDVSA).159 The payment
came after one of PDVSA's mid-level employees demanded it in
exchange for releasing funds that Pride was entitled to for services
already rendered.160 Once the payment went through, Pride quickly
received the money it was due. Summers later settled the charges
against him by paying a fine of $25,000.161
This case is problematic for two reasons. First, when Summers
paid $30,000 to secure money that his firm was already entitled to,
nothing suggests that his purpose was to induce a government worker
to "misuse" her official position. If anything, Summers intended for
the payment to prompt the official to actually fulfill her lawful duty
and pay the amount owed. Similarly, it is difficult to see how Sum-
mers's payment constituted a bribe "intended to produce an effect. . .
that would 'assist in obtaining or retaining business."' The "business"
that Summers engaged in was completed prior to the demand for the
bribe. Just as in the hypothetical of the exploding oil rig, the money
that Summers paid was to protect Pride from being placed in a worse
position than it would have been absent the payment. The SEC did
not argue that Summers paid the ransom in order to compete for new
or existing business, or otherwise try to distinguish this case from the
example in Kay of an already profitable venture simply increasing its
profits. It thus remains unclear what the government considered the
necessary business nexus to be under these facts.
Related issues arise in cases where the lines between solicitation
and extortion are harder to differentiate. As Lindgren notes, "[T] he
same envelope filled with cash can be both a payment extorted under
a threat of unfairly negative treatment and a bribe obtained under a
159 See Complaint at 5, SEC v. Summers, No. 4:10-cv-02786 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 5,
2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr21617.htm. The
complaint indicates that "[f]ollowing widespread strikes and civil unrest in Venezuela
in late 2002, [Pride's Venezuelan subsidiary] and other companies performing work
for PDVSA [the state-owned oil company] had difficulty collecting outstanding receiv-
ables from PDVSA." Id. Pride's subsidiary later received information that a "mid-level
PDVSA accounts payable employee was holding up the payment of funds owed to
[Pride] and wanted a payment of approximately $30,000 in order to release the funds
due." Id. The complaint further alleged that Summers authorized or allowed pay-
ments totaling approximately $384,000 to be made to third parties with the belief that
those funds would be given to Venezuelan officials in order to secure several drilling
contract extensions. Id. at 1.
160 See Litig. Release No. 21617, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Charges Former
Employee of Pride International with Violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
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promise of unfairly positive treatment." 162 Depending on the context
of a particular bribe request, the circumstantial evidence surrounding
a defendant's mental state can be open to multiple interpretations. 163
An employee working in places like Africa or Eastern Europe may feel
like a victim of extortion when threats are made against her
employer's existing investment only to later find the DOJ arguing that
she simply acquiesced to a request for a bribe. Similarly, the govern-
ment may view a payment outside of normal channels as a bribe when
that thought never crossed the mind of the employee paying it. In
many countries, payments made in response to subtle hints by foreign
officials do not breach obvious social norms in the same way that
behaviors like theft or assault do. 16 4
A few courts have tried to address these issues through jury
instructions. The trial court in Kay gave an instruction saying that
threats of "serious economic loss" could negate the FCPA's corrupt
intent requirement. 16 The court defined "extortion" as "obtaining
money or something of value from another person by intimidation,
162 James Lindgren, The Theory, History, and Practice of the Bribery-Extortion Distinc-
tion, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1695, 1700 (1993).
163 See Ribstein, supra note 52, at 10.
164 Id. at 7-8 ("In the business context it may be particularly unclear when behav-
ior crosses the line from hard-nosed competition that is at most subject to a civil
action to what society considers criminal. For example, it may not be clear how to
distinguish aggressive but legitimate competitive behavior from criminal violations of
the antitrust laws. . . . By contrast, most non-corporate criminal behavior is criminal
because it breaches clear social norms.").
165 See United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2004). The Second Circuit
reached a similar result in a non-FCPA case involving allegations that a defendant
paid a bribe to an IRS agent. See United States v. Barash, 365 F.2d 395, 401-02 (2d
Cir. 1966) (allowing instruction on intent where a defendant accused of bribing an
IRS agent lays a foundation indicating that an alleged bribe was made after a govern-
ment officer "threatens serious economic loss"). The U.S. domestic bribery statute
largely tracks the language of the FCPA with respect to unlawful bribery; the statute,
18 U.S.C. § 201, provides that:
Whoever . . . directly or indirectly, corruptly gives, offers or promises any-
thing of value to any public official . . . with intent (A) to influence any
official act; or (B) to influence such public official . . . to commit or aid in
committing, or collude in, or allow, any fraud, or make opportunity for the
commission of any fraud, on the United States; or (C) to induce such public
official . . . to do or omit to do any act in violation of the lawful duty [shall
be fined and/or imprisoned].
18 U.S.C. § 201 (2006).
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threats of serious economic loss to a person or a business, or withhold-
ing official action until the official's demands are met."166
By contrast, in United States v. Kozeny167 the court held that only
"true extortion" could negate the corrupt intent required by the
FCPA.168 The court distinguished economic extortion by saying that a
defendant can simply walk away from economic threats-something
that is impossible when facing threats of physical harm. 169 The diffi-
culty with this reasoning, however, is that it confuses the relationship
between the type of threat at issue and the intent required for FCPA
liability. If a defendant did not intend for a payment to induce an
official to misuse her position, then it is irrelevant whether the reason
for the defendant's lack of intent was based on a threat of physical
harm or economic loss.17 0 Put differently, it is impossible to define
from the outset the universe of threats that will negate corrupt intent.
The question is more nuanced and requires assessing all circum-
stances surrounding a challenged payment.
Practically speaking, though, even the Kay instruction will likely
provide little comfort to firms or employees trying to ensure FCPA
compliance. For one thing, Kay did not articulate how "serious" an
economic loss must be before it will constitute economic extortion.
Even if courts provide guidance on this question, firms and employees
are still left in the untenable position of trying to determine which
payments are actually "corrupt" and which ones will later be consid-
ered as such by regulators. As Summers indicates, firms cannot pre-
sume that payments to protect existing investments will escape
scrutiny even when they were not intended to induce an official to
misuse her position or to provide the payer with a competitive advan-
tage. Individual employees and agents will find it increasingly difficult
to discern when compliance ends and exposure to liability begins if
prosecutors continue to expand their definition of the FCPA's
required mental state.
166 See Urofsky, supra note 7, at 883 (citing Jury Instructions at 23-24, United
States v. Kay, 200 F. Supp. 2d 681 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (No. 4:01-cr-00914), rev'd 359 F.3d
738 (5th Cir. 2004)).
167 582 F. Supp. 2d 535 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
168 See id. at 540.
169 See Barash, 365 F.2d at 402.
170 See Theodore C. Sorensen, Improper Payments Abroad: Perspectives and Proposals,
54 FOREIGN AFF. 719, 722 (1975-76) ("A company which can demonstrate that it was
truly confronted with an unmistakable choice between paying a corrupt foreign offi-
cial, or seeing its entire investment in that country expropriated, is not paying a
'bribe.'").
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2. The Facilitation Payment Exception
While regulators continue to take an increasingly expansive view
of the FCPA mens rea requirements, they have significantly narrowed
the scope of the statute's facilitation payment exception. This excep-
tion provides that payments made "to expedite or to secure the per-
formance of a routine governmental action" are exempted from the
FCPA's anti-bribery provisions. 171 The statute defines "routine gov-
ernmental action" as "an action which is ordinarily and commonly
performed by a foreign official."' 72 It further lists several examples of
permissible facilitation payments, which include payments made in
connection with granting permits, processing government papers,
scheduling inspections, providing power or water service, mail pick-up
and delivery, providing police protection, and "actions of a similar
nature."173
Though U.S. domestic anti-bribery laws do not contain a facilita-
tion payment exception, Congress found it necessary in the context of
the FCPA because some payments that look like bribery in the United
States are not viewed the same way under the cultural norms of other
countries.174 Yet this cultural sensitivity is not limitless. The FCPA
provides that any decision by a foreign official to award new or contin-
ued business, or any action taken by a foreign official to encourage a
decision to award new or continued business, would not constitute
"routine governmental action." In addition, Congress has emphasized
that the exception should only apply to actions by foreign officials that
are non-discretionary. The FCPA's legislative history notes that pay-
ments that "merely move a particular matter toward an eventual act or
decision" should be permitted, whereas those that "cause an official to
exercise other than his free will" should not.175
This distinction is easily stated, but applying it in practice can be
difficult. Many firms report that bribe demands frequently come from
lower-level foreign officials in the areas of tax and customs who make
it explicitly or implicitly known that bribery will be a necessary cost of
doing business with them. For example, customs officials often tell
firms that no goods will move in or out of the country unless a side
171 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(b) (2006).
172 Id. § 78dd-2(h) (4) (A).
173 Id.
174 See H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 8 (1977) ("While payments made to assure or to
speed the proper performance of a foreign official's duties may be reprehensible in
the United States, the committee recognizes that they are not necessarily so viewed
elsewhere in the world and that it is not feasible for the United States to attempt
unilaterally to eradicate all such payments.").
175 Id.
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payment is forthcoming.17 6 Payments made in response to these types
of demands would seem to constitute permissible facilitation pay-
ments under the definitions above, but in the current enforcement
environment this conclusion can rarely be relied upon.
This became most evident in the case of Westinghouse Air Brake
Technologies Corp. ("Wabtec"). In 2008, the DOJ charged Wabtec
with FCPA violations based on payments that its subsidiary in India
made to officials employed by the Indian Railway Board. Some of the
payments were made to assist the subsidiary in receiving new contracts
and to limit excise tax audits, and thus represented clear violations of
the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions.1 7 7 However, other challenged pay-
ments were made to schedule pre-shipping product inspections and to
have certificates of delivery issued for certain products. 1 7  Because
the matter ultimately settled through a non-prosecution agreement
and no formal charging document was ever filed, the DOJ's theory as
to why the latter payments did not fall within the facilitation payment
exception remains unclear. If the payments were made simply to have
certificates of delivery issued or to schedule inspections, those acts
would seemingly qualify as "routine governmental actions."
The FCPA's accounting provisions add an additional layer of
complexity. In an enforcement action against Triton Energy Corpora-
tion, the company was alleged to have violated the FCPA's accounting
and internal control provisions-but not the anti-bribery provisions-
by misreporting ostensibly permissible facilitation payments of
approximately $1,000 each that were made to expedite the receipt of
monthly invoices.179 The specter of an FCPA enforcement action
under these facts puts firms in a difficult position. Even if they think
they can comply with the statutory exception, firms will likely remain
reluctant to accurately record facilitation payments out of fear that
they may create an appearance of impropriety or provide evidence of
a violation of local law.1 80
The uncertainty in this area has prompted many firms to adopt
strict "zero tolerance" policies that prohibit facilitation payments of
any type-including those that, if documented, would appear to fall
176 See Urofsky, supra note 7, at 880.
177 See Warin et al., supra note 28, at 63.
178 See id.
179 See Litig. Release No. 15266, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Securities and
Exchange Commission v. Triton Energy Corporation, et al. (Feb. 27, 1997).
180 Thomas R. Fox, The End of the FCPA Facilitation Payment Exception?, FCPA Com-
PLIANCE & ETHICS BLOG (Nov. 11, 2010, 9:26 PM), http://tfoxlaw.wordpress.com/
2010/11/11.
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within the statutory exception.18 1 But this too is fraught with difficul-
ties. Companies that take a zero-tolerance attitude with respect to
facilitation payments "run the risk that officials will not concede the
ground so easily and will retaliate by delaying or even denying their
applications for permits and licenses for real or imaginary technical
noncompliance." 1 8 2 This will only add to the pressures already faced
by agents, employees, and intermediaries attempting to meet dead-
lines and performance targets.18 3
3. Who Is a "Foreign Official"?
A final area where the aggressive posture assumed by U.S. regula-
tors creates uncertainty for firms facing bribe demands concerns the
FCPA's definition of "foreign official." The statute defines "foreign
official" as
any officer or employee of a foreign government or any depart-
ment, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or of a public interna-
tional organization, or any person acting in an official capacity for
or on behalf of any such government or department, agency, or
instrumentality, or for or on behalf of any such public international
organization. 184
Most of the confusion surrounding this language centers on the
ambiguous term "instrumentality." The FCPA does not define "instru-
mentality," nor does it provide any factors that will be used to deter-
mine what types of entities are instrumentalities of foreign
governments such that their officers and employees would be deemed
"foreign officials" within the meaning of the statute. The DOJ itself
has admitted that the term "foreign official" as used in the FCPA poses
difficult interpretation issues for firms.18 5 Rather than attempt to nar-
row the term's scope, or at least describe the characteristics that the
DOJ uses to evaluate whether a person or entity qualifies as a foreign
official, the agency admits that "it is entirely possible, under certain
circumstances and in certain countries, that nearly every aspect of the
approval, manufacture, import, export, pricing, sale and marketing of
181 "An October 2009 TRACE International survey about facilitating payments
revealed that approximately 35% of the companies surveyed had policies prohibiting
facilitating payments." Warin et al., supra note 28, at 64-65 (noting also that firms
have also been pressured by international organizations to ban facilitation payments
on the grounds that they are "corrosive" on the rule of law and overall economic
development).
182 Urofsky, supra note 7, at 882.
183 See id.
184 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f) (2006).
185 See Koehler, supra note 12, at 964-65.
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a . . . product in a foreign country will involve a 'foreign official'
within the meaning of the FCPA."' 86
Despite a lack of formal regulatory guidance, the DOJ and SEC
have clearly demonstrated that they believe the definition of "foreign
official" extends at least to state-owned entities and their employ-
ees.187 In fact, the majority of recent FCPA enforcement actions have
been premised on payments made to "non-core" individuals who are
employed by state-owned or state-controlled entities, rather than pay-
ments made to persons directly employed by a foreign state.188
The issue for firms and employees facing bribe demands thus
becomes trying to determine ex ante what companies are sufficiently
state-owned or state-controlled to qualify as an instrumentality of a
foreign official in the eyes of federal regulators. This is not always an
easy task. For example, several recent FCPA enforcement actions have
demonstrated the unique challenges presented by doing business in
China, where state ownership is particularly high. The DOJ and SEC
have alleged that actors such as physicians working in state-owned hos-
pitals' 89 and journalists working for state-run media companies' 90
constitute "foreign officials" under the FCPA even though this conclu-
sion would not be obvious to many outsiders. Estimates further sug-
gest that the government is a majority shareholder in at least 31% of
all publicly listed companies in China, while also maintaining author-
ity over the country's major banks and five largest electricity conglom-
erates. 191 Many practitioners admit that they often cannot determine
with confidence whether bribe requests in countries like China are
coming from a government official or a private citizen.192
DOJ and SEC enforcement patterns further indicate that even
minority state ownership creates a risk that an entity or organization
will be treated as a "foreign official" for the purposes of the FCPA. In
186 Id. at 965. Koehler adds that this statement was made before an audience com-
posed of representatives from the pharmaceutical industry, an industry that has
become subject to a high degree of FCPA scrutiny. Id.
187 See WEISSMAN & SMITH, supra note 45, at 25; Koehler, supra note 12, at 965.
188 See WEISSMAN & SMITH, supra note 45, at 26-27; Koehler, supra note 12, at 965.
189 See Thomas R. Fox, What's in a Name: Agents, Resellers, and Distributors Under the
FCPA, FCPA COMPLIANCE & ETHICS BLOC (Nov. 15, 2010, 1:57 PM), http://tfoxlaw.
wordpress.com/2010/11/15 (discussing FCPA enforcement action against AGA Med-
ical Corp., where a distributor hired by AGA paid bribes totaling $460,000 to doctors
in state-owned hospitals).
190 Warin et al., supra note 28, at 44 ("In a 2008 opinion procedure release, the
U.S. Department of Justice ('DOJ') assumed that journalists working for state-run
media outlets in China fall under the FCPA's definition of 'foreign official.'").
191 See id. at 45.
192 WRAGE, supra note 66, at 11-12.
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an action against KBR, the SEC and DOJ claimed that payments made
to employees of the oil firm Nigeria LNG Limited constituted bribes
paid to "foreign officials." 9 3 However, Nigeria only owns 49% of
Nigeria LNG, with the remaining shares held by private oil compa-
nies. 194 In a similar case, FCPA-related charges were brought against
Alcatel-Lucent, S.A., based on payments made to Telekom Malaysia
Berhad ("TMB"), a telecommunications company where the Malay-
sian government holds only a 43% stake.195 Despite having a sub-
majority holding percentage, federal authorities alleged that TMB was
an instrumentality of a foreign official because the Malaysian govern-
ment had the ability to appoint officers, "had veto power over ...
major expenditures, and made [certain key] operational decisions."1 9 6
These cases raise the question ofjust how far the government will
extend the term "instrumentality."' 97 At the very least it appears firms
and their employees must do more than simply analyze the ownership
structure of entities with foreign government ties. Firms must go one
step further and discern the level of control that the government has
193 Litig. Release No. 20897A, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Charges KBR, Inc.
with Foreign Bribery; Charges Halliburton Co. and KBR, Inc. with Related Account-
ing Violations-Companies to Pay Disgorgement of $177 Million; KBR Subsidiary to
Pay Criminal Fines of $402 Million; Total Payments to Be $579 Million (Feb. 11,
2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/lr20897a.htm.
194 See Business Structure in Nigeria: Liquefied Natural Gas, SHELL, http://www.shell.
com.ng/home/content/nga/aboutshell/shell businesses/Ing/ (last visited Oct. 14,
2011). The private oil companies at issue were Shell, Total, and Eni.
195 As Professor Koehler notes, TMB describes itself as "privatized." See Mike
Koehler, "Foreign Official" Limbo ... How Low Can It Go?, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 10,
2011, 5:30 AM), http://fcpaprofessor.blogspot.com/2011/01/foreign-official-limbo-
how-low-can-it.html.
196 Information at 10-11, United States v. Alcatel-Lucent, S.A., No. 10-20907-CR-
Moore/Simonton (S.D. Fla. Dec. 27, 2010).
197 A recent FCPA enforcement action against Comverse premised on alleged
accounting violations involved payments made to Hellenic Telecommunications
Organization, S.A. ("OTE"), a telecommunications provider partially owned by the
Greek government. The action indicates that the United States government is contin-
uing to lower its understanding of the ownership threshold necessary for state owner-
ship. Although the FCPA's accounting prohibitions do not contain a "foreign
official" element, the Comverse case is notable in that historically the Greek govern-
ment has only owned between a 33 and 38% interest in OTE. See Mike Koehler,
Converse Technology ... Is it Really That Simple?, FCPA PROFESSOR (Apr. 12, 2011, 5:26
AM), http://fcpaprofessor.blogspot.com/2011/04/comverse-technology-is-it-really-
that.html. Furthermore, OTE's annual reports provide that Greece "may-only as a
shareholder-monitor the operation and administration of the corporate affairs."
Mike Koehler, "Foreign Official" Limbo-The Bar Has Been Lowered, FCPA PROFESSOR
(Apr. 15, 2011), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/foreign-official-limbo-the-bar-has-
been-lowered.
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over a particular entity or organization-including those entities that
would not immediately bring to mind government involvement.
4. Implications: Increased Monitoring Costs and the Risk of
Overdeterrence
The aggressive interpretation of the FCPA's core provisions raises
several issues for firms that must deal with bribe demands. Of most
immediate concern is the need to implement compliance programs
that match the increasingly expansive gloss that regulators have
applied to the statute. Companies depend on predictability in the law
so that they can clearly articulate for firm employees and agents how
compliance is to be accomplished and engage in efficient business
planning. If we think back to the FCPA actions against NATCO and
Joe Summers, one lesson from the NATCO case is to accurately record
payments made in response to extortionate threats that put one's
employees in danger. This is necessary to avoid liability under the
FCPA's accounting provisions. Yet, Summers'" teaches that payments
made under similar circumstances can lead to charges under the
FCPA's anti-bribery provisions, despite apparent tension with the
FCPA's mens rea requirements and the inability to rely on all courts to
give an economic extortion jury instruction. This dynamic can con-
fuse firms that are legitimately trying to comply with the law and limit
their ability to provide instructions that will give agents and employees
clear direction.
Firms could respond to these concerns by taking a more active
role every time an employee or agent receives a demand for payment
from a foreign official that in any way touches upon the firm's busi-
ness activities. The problem with this approach is that at some point
close monitoring negates the benefits that come from delegating
authority to agents in the first place. Close monitoring is also expen-
sive. For large firms with agents and employees spread across multiple
markets, the practical challenge of intervening in every case of bribe
solicitation will be highly prohibitive.
The breadth of current FCPA enforcement policy can also
prompt firms to launch costly and time-intensive internal investiga-
tions for "ambiguous, internal allegations of conduct that could
potentially implicate the FCPA" in the eyes of regulators. 99 In one
recent example a firm disclosed that it spent $3.2 million to investi-
gate $50,000 of "potentially" improper payments made by a foreign
branch that accounts for approximately one-half of 1% of the com-
198 See supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
199 Koehler, supra note 12, at 1005.
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pany's total annual revenue. 200 These costs will ultimately be passed
along to a firm's shareholders and may mean diversions from other,
more profitable activities.201 More immediately, internal investiga-
tions will cause disruptions to current business operations and
employee morale as documents and computers are seized and
employees are deposed.202
Another danger posed by legal uncertainty under the FCPA is
that agents and employees will become overly risk-averse and thus
deterred from taking actions that would otherwise benefit their firms.
For example, they may reject making payments in response to
demands that appear permissible under the facilitation payment
exception due to concerns that the DOJ or SEC will later consider
them suspect. A recent Dow Jones survey found that 51% of compa-
nies have delayed, and 14% have cancelled, business ventures abroad
due to uncertainty over FCPA enforcement.203 If United States firms
leave markets under these circumstances, they may also be put at a
competitive disadvantage as firms from countries without FCPA-like
legislation step in to fill their vacancies. This has already been
observed in practice. In 2009, the oil services firm Ensco Interna-
tional elected to abandon operations in Nigeria due to concerns that
it may be subjected to FCPA scrutiny after making payments to cus-
toms officials to obtain permission to import oil-drilling rigs. 204 Simi-
lar events have transpired in Kazakhstan as increased FCPA scrutiny
has seen United States oil firms withdraw only to be replaced by their
Chinese competitors. 205 Not only does market exit of this type nega-
tively impact United States firms hoping to do business abroad, the
citizens of the countries left behind face the risk of poor quality substi-
200 Interview with Richard Alderman, Dir., U.K. Serious Fraud Office (on file with
author). The costs of internal investigations escalate as the scope of potential liability
expands. For example, the record-setting FCPA settlement in 2008 by Siemens AG
was preceded by the company's own internal audit. This audit involved the services of
over 1,500 lawyers, accountants, and support staff personnel, who billed approxi-
mately 1.5 million hours reviewing 167 million financial and accounting documents.
The total bill to Siemens reached $1 billion-nearly the cost of its eventual settlement
of $1.6 billion with United States and German authorities. See Vardi, supra note 5, at
74.
201 See Koehler, supra note 12, at 954.
202 See WRAGE, supra note 66, at 116.
203 Westbrook, supra note 3, at 498.
204 Vardi, supra note 5, at 77.
205 Id.
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tutes. Some scholars have compared this result to the effects felt after
the imposition of economic sanctions.206
Of course, one way for firms to gain clarity on the legal status of
payments made in response to bribe demands and extortionate
threats would be to test the DOJ and SEC's enforcement theories in
court. But FCPA litigation continues to be rare and there are few
reported FCPA judicial opinions. The potential monetary and reputa-
tional consequences that would follow from an FCPA indictment or
guilty verdict at trial generally leave firms with no realistic option
other than to seek settlement on the most favorable terms possible.
For individual defendants, this typically means entering a guilty plea.
For firms, it means agreeing to a deferred prosecution agreement
(DPA) or a non-prosecution agreement (NPA).
Under a DPA, the prosecution files a formal charging document
with the court but defers actual prosecution if the defendant firm
agrees to implement and maintain various governance requirements,
pay a fine, and disgorge profits.207 If the firm fulfills its obligations
under the DPA the prosecution later withdraws the charge. NPAs usu-
ally require firms to accept similar terms, but the difference is formal
charges are never filed.
Commentators suggest that a climate where firms feel they must
accept DPAs and NPAs emboldens the DOJ and SEC to advance broad
and vague theories of FCPA liability that rarely, if ever, receive judicial
scrutiny.20 Even though these agreements are often negotiated vigor-
ously, their final terms are not subject to any judicial oversight.
Whether this situation truly provides regulators with too much lever-
age is outside this Article's scope. What appears undeniable, however,
is that an absence ofjudicial review on key aspects of the FCPA makes
it considerably more difficult for firms to design compliance programs
that efficiently separate lawful but aggressive competitive activity from
conduct that clearly violates the statute.
IV. SUGGESTIONS AND ALTERNATIVES
Several options are available to alleviate some of the governance
challenges and compliance headaches that result from widespread
206 See Andrew Brady Spalding, Unwitting Sanctions: Understanding Anti-Bribery Legis-
lation as Economic Sanctions Against Emerging Markets, 62 FIA. L. REV. 351, 356 (2010).
207 One of the most burdensome compliance requirements typically included as
part of a deferred or non-prosecution agreement is the commitment on behalf of the
corporation to retain an outside monitor for an extended period of time. The com-
pliance monitor hired by Siemens AG following its settlement with the DOJ was pro-
jected to cost $52 million over four years. See Vardi, supra note 5, at 76.
208 See Koehler, supra note 12, at 909.
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bribe demands. One option would involve making changes to the
FCPA itself. For example, to add clarity to the law, the FCPA could be
altered to either permit all bribes or to clearly prohibit all payments
made in response to solicitation or extortion (including facilitation
payments). A less drastic way to help firms fulfill their compliance
obligations would be to provide them with more guidance on the
grayer areas of the FCPA. Still another option would be to leave the
FCPA's basic structure intact and instead devote more regulatory
attention and resources to dealing with the demand-side origins of
corruption. The advantages and disadvantages of these approaches
are discussed below.209
A. Changes to the FCPA
1. Permit All Bribes
The most direct way to "help" firms design clear, workable anti-
bribery compliance programs would be to simply get rid of the FCPA
and permit them to pay bribes. Under this approach, the sometimes-
blurry lines between active bribery, passive bribery, and extortion
would simply melt away. Firms would no longer need to monitor
agents that receive bribe demands and could expand unfettered into
markets where corruption is common.
But as attractive as this option might seem from a clarity and pre-
dictability standpoint, morally and politically it is a non-starter. Cor-
ruption has been universally condemned by governments,
international organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
and religious groups. Former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi
Annan describes transnational bribery as "an insidious plague that has
a wide range of corrosive effects on societies. It undermines democ-
racy and the rule of law, leads to violations of human rights, distorts
209 As Professor Westbrook notes:
Some legislation has been recently introduced that would alter the FCPA.
The Foreign Business Bribery Prohibition Act of 2009, H.R. 2152, 111th
Cong. (2009) (sponsored by Rep. Ed Perlmutter (D-CO)), would authorize
certain private rights of action under the FCPA for violations by foreign con-
cerns that damage domestic businesses. The Energy Security Through
Transparency Act of 2009, S. 1700, 111th Cong. (2009) (sponsored by Sen.
Richard Lugar (R-IN)), would require certain issuers to disclose payments to
foreign governments for the commercial development of energy resources.
Neither bill has made it out of committee.
Westbrook, supra note 3, at 503 n.56.
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markets, erodes the quality of life, and allows organized crime, terror-
ism, and other threats to human security to flourish." 210
The FCPA is part of the global response to these harms. Any pull-
back in the fight against corruption by federal regulators would
represent a significant departure from current policy and likely harm
the United States' reputation in the international community. The
United States became a pioneer in the area of extraterritorial anti-
corruption legislation when it passed the FCPA. This subsequently led
American officials to urge other countries to adopt similar measures.
Though the motivation was largely selfish-United States firms
believed the FCPA put them at a competitive disadvantage compared
to firms that weren't subject to similar restraints on bribery-this pres-
sure eventually culminated in the OECD Convention and the passage
of several FCPA-like laws in other countries. This was not an easy pro-
cess. Many countries initially resisted efforts to curb corruption
because they believed that bribery (and available tax deductions for
bribery) provided their companies with the only advantage they could
obtain over their American competitors-an advantage they were
reluctant to give up. Existing international anti-corruption accom-
plishments could thus be put in jeopardy if the United States altered
its solid anti-corruption stance.
2. Clearly Prohibit All "Bribes"
Another way to provide greater certainty under the FCPA would
be to clearly prohibit all "bribe" payments-including facilitation pay-
ments, as well as payments that were first solicited by foreign officials
or made in response to extortionate threats. Under this approach,
firms would be able to provide explicit instructions to all agents and
employees and obviate the need for them to spend time analyzing
whether a payment satisfies the business nexus requirement, is cor-
rupt, or qualifies as a permissible facilitation payment. This approach
would also be consistent with the DOJ's and SEC's existing attitudes
toward FCPA enforcement, where the message often appears to be
"do not bribe, and do not do anything that remotely resembles
bribery."
But before heading down this path, several issues must first be
addressed. For one, expanding the scope of the FCPA's prohibited
conduct will do nothing to address the agency costs that firms already
210 JULIE R. O'SULLIVAN, FEDERAL WHITE COLLAR CRIME 552 (4th ed. 2009) (quot-
ing Kofi Annan, Secretary-General, United Nations, Statement on the Adoption by
the General Assembly of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (Oct. 31,
2003), available at http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=60
2 ).
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face when retaining specialized foreign agents in distant markets.
Even if firms can get these costs under control through incentives or
other means, this approach arguably conflicts with the FCPA's original
purpose, raises normative fairness concerns, and could lead to market
withdrawal.
a. Clarifying the Purpose of Anti-Bribery Legislation
In one sense, expanding the scope of the FCPA to prohibit all
payments in response to solicitation or extortion might seem inconsis-
tent with the statute's legislative history. When the FCPA was passed
in 1977, Congress cited the effect of bribery on competition as the
main justification for the legislation. The Senate Report accompany-
ing the final version of the bill provided that:
Corporate bribery is bad business. In our free market system it is
basic that the sale of products should take place on the basis of
price, quality, and service. Corporate bribery is fundamentally
destructive of this basic tenet. Corporate bribery of foreign officials
takes place primarily to assist corporations in gaining business.
Thus foreign corporate bribery affects the very stability of overseas
business. Foreign corporate bribes also affect our domestic compet-
itive climate when domestic firms engage in such practices as a sub-
stitute for healthy competition for foreign business. 21'
If preserving free and fair competition is the goal of the FCPA,
then banning payments in response to extortionate threats will not
always square with that goal. Payments to obtain money that one is
already owed or to prevent other types of economic harm do not pro-
vide firms with a competitive advantage in the sense of gaining busi-
ness that they would not otherwise be entitled to.
On the other hand, prohibiting even these types of payments
would bring the FCPA in line with the driving forces behind interna-
tional anti-bribery instruments like the OECD Convention and the
UNCAC. These instruments aim to combat the harms of corruption
in general-harms that go beyond adverse effects on competition.
The preamble to the OECD Convention says that bribery in interna-
tional business transactions "raises serious moral and political con-
cerns, undermines good governance and economic development, and
211 S. REP. No. 95-114, at 4 (1977). The House Report accompanying an earlier
version of the FCPA emphasized the fact that many of the corrupt payments uncov-
ered during the SEC's Watergate investigation were made not to compete with for-
eign companies, but rather to gain an advantage over a competing American firm.
See H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 4, 5 (1977).
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distorts international competitive conditions." 212  Similarly, the
UNCAC's preamble proclaims that corruption undermines "the insti-
tutions and values of democracy, ethical values and justice," and jeop-
ardizes "sustainable development and the rule of law." 213 The OECD
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises further say that bribe solicita-
tion and extortion discourage "attempts by citizens to achieve higher
levels of economic, social and environmental welfare" and hinder
"efforts to reduce poverty."214
Reframing the FCPA's intent to fit within this framework would
cause the distinction between bribery and extortion to collapse. Even
if they do not provide payers with a competitive advantage, payments
made in response to extortion still produce injurious effects on
domestic markets. They allow for the perpetuation of corrupt prac-
tices and lend support to other forms of crime such as organized
crime and money laundering.215 As a result, a person who fails to
resist a demand for payment effectively aids and abets the harms gen-
erated by corruption. This is one reason why the OECD Convention
prohibits bribes to obtain or retain "business or other improper advan-
tage."216 The "other improper advantage" language was included by
the OECD to make it clear that anti-bribery legislation should do
more than just prohibit bribes to obtain business per se.
Though they have not issued formal commentary on this issue,
federal regulators already appear to agree with the OECD's stance. In
the SEC's complaint against Joe Summers, the agency alleged that
Summers's payment to secure unpaid receivables was for the purpose
of "securing an improper advantage."217 In a related case the DOJ
charged Pride International with conspiracy to make payments "in
order to obtain or retain business and to obtain other favorable treat-
ment."218 And finally, in a non-prosecution agreement reached with
212 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 102, at pmbl.
213 United Nations Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4, U.N. Doc. A/
RES/58/4, at pmbl. (Oct. 31, 2003) [hereinafter UNCAC].
214 ORG. FOR ECON. DEv., OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 48
(2008), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf. This senti-
ment was not completely foreign at the time the FCPA was enacted. President Carter
noted when signing the bill that " [clorrupt practices between corporations and pub-
lic officials overseas undermine the integrity and stability of governments." Statement
on Signing the Foreign Corrupt Practices and Investment Disclosure Bill, 13 WEEKLY
Comp. PREs. Doc. 1909, 1909 (Dec. 20, 1977).
215 See UNCAC, supra note 213, at pmbl.
216 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 102, at art. 1, 1 4 (emphasis
added).
217 Complaint, supra note 159, at 6 (emphasis added).
218 SHEAlU'AN & STERLING LLP, supra note 40, at xv.
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Noble, the DOJ stated that the FCPA is intended to prohibit payments
"for the purpose of obtaining or retaining business or securing any
improper advantage."21 9 None of the highlighted language appears in
the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions and is instead a reference to the
OECD Convention.
Still, despite the SEC's and DOJ's apparent acceptance of the
OECD language, more regulatory guidance would be necessary to
clear up a lingering problem. The OECD defines an improper advan-
tage as "something to which the company concerned was not clearly
entitled, for example, an operating permit for a factory which fails to
meet the statutory requirements." 220 As indicated before, payments in
response to economic extortion do not always provide firms with this
type of advantage. 2 2 1 United States authorities would thus need to
clarify their interpretation of "improper advantage" to the extent it
differs from the OECD if this language were to be added to the FCPA
formally through an amendment or informally through implementing
regulations.
b. Normative Fairness Concerns
Another issue that would be raised by prohibiting all payments in
response to solicitation and extortion concerns basic fairness. This
comes up primarily in cases of extortion, where the payer is described
as a victim rather than perpetrator.
Most people agree that it would be unfair to force firms to choose
between exposure to legal liability and the safety of their personnel,
and thus happily accept the FCPA's unwritten defense in cases of
"true extortion" (i.e., threats of harm to person or property). 222 How-
ever, fairness becomes hazier when addressing economic extortion. A
strong argument can be made that fairness concerns do not warrant a
defense when threats are made only to existing investments. If we
look again at the NATCO enforcement action, the fine imposed in
that case was relatively small ($65,000), and the company must have
been aware of the risks of doing business in Kazakhstan.223 If paying
bribes or responding to economic extortion is a cost of doing business
in a market and companies are still willing to enter, then FCPA
enforcement only adds to the costs of doing so. NATCO surely would
have adjusted its expected return by taking these costs into account
219 Id.
220 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 102, at art. 1, 1 5.
221 See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
222 See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
223 See supra text accompanying notes 72-77.
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when making the decision to invest. Allowing the company to escape
FCPA enforcement as a "victim" of economic extortion would provide
it with an unjustified windfall (to say nothing of bolstering corrupt
practices in Eastern Europe).
Though this analysis works for firms, its application to individual
defendants is more difficult. Agents and employees who receive
threats often generate more sympathy than economically rational
firms, and arguably they should not be punished as a result of pres-
sure imposed on them by corrupt foreign officials. 2 2 4 On the other
hand, the harms caused by bribery and extortion do not depend on
how blame is apportioned between payer and payee.
One way to resolve this debate harkens back to the term "cor-
rupt." Does a person act corruptly-or abet corruption-when she
fails to resist demand-side pressure? If so, a ban on payments made in
response to economic extortion appears fair regardless of whether the
payer is an individual or a firm. The trouble with this reasoning is that
the meaning of "corruptly" is usually defined in a different way. The
FCPA, OECD Convention, and UNCAC all define corruption in terms
of paying a foreign official to do something that the official should
not do because it would violate her duty.22 5 A person would not be
acting corruptly under these definitions if she paid a foreign official to
do something that would not be an affirmative violation of duty, such
as fulfilling a predetermined obligation to provide the payer with
something she was already entitled to receive. Penalizing the payer in
that situation would appear unfair since she did not act with the
required intent.
Still another fairness concern arises because courts in different
jurisdictions often apply inconsistent approaches to extortion. In the
Kozeny case from 2008, defendant Frederick Bourke was charged
under the FCPA for paying bribes to Azeri officials to encourage the
privatization of the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic. 22 6
Bourke claimed that the payments were lawful under Azeri law
because bribe payers in that country are relieved of liability if they
were the victims of extortion.227 He therefore sought to invoke the
224 See David Mills & Robert Weisberg, Corrupting the Harm Requirement in White
Collar Crime, 60 STAN. L. REv. 1371, 1375 (2008).
225 According to the UNCAC, bribery is defined as "[t]he promise, offering or
giving, to a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the offi-
cial himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or
refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties." UNCAC, supra note 213, at
ch. III, art. 15(a) (emphasis added).
226 See United States v. Kozeny, 582 F. Supp. 2d 535, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
227 See id.
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FCPA's affirmative defense for payments that are lawful under the law
of the country where they were made. Judge Scheindlin of Southern
District of New York rejected this attempt, however, holding that the
FCPA's defense only applies where a foreign law expressly allows a
payment, not when it simply provides a defense or exception to liabil-
ity.2 28 Though this case dealt with the FCPA's affirmative defenses,
similar issues would arise if the FCPA's scope were to be expanded to
clearly prohibit payments in response to economic extortion. Assum-
ing they are subject to multiple jurisdictions, agents in countries like
Azerbaijan could find themselves excused under their own laws only
to later become exposed to liability under the FCPA.
c. Market Exit
It has already been observed that widespread demand-side cor-
ruption discourages firms from doing business in particular mar-
kets. 2 2 9 If the FCPA is altered to prohibit all bribe payments-
including facilitation payments and payments in response to eco-
nomic extortion-this concern would be amplified to the extent that
firms might effectively be prevented from doing any business in some
countries.
For example, China is quickly establishing itself as one of the
most significant markets for U.S. firms. But because corruption is
rampant in China, it is difficult to do business there on lawful
terms. 230 China's cultural and social norms of gift giving introduce
additional complications. Representatives of Western companies are
typically told that they should give gifts to Chinese officials when
meeting to discuss business transactions in order to show that a rela-
tionship of friendship is intended. This practice, and the relation-
ships that are established through it, are collectively referred to as
"guanxi."231 Guanxi can result in large amounts of money being spent
on gifts and hospitality on an almost daily basis during the life of a
particular deal.
However, the relationship between guanxi and the FCPA's facili-
tation payment is ambiguous, which already makes it difficult to
228 See id. at 539.
229 See supra text accompanying notes 96-98.
230 China recently ranked in the bottom half on Transparency International's Cor-
ruption Perceptions Index, indicating that it is perceived by the public sector to be
highly corrupt. See TRANSPARENCY INT'L, supra note 82, at 3.
231 See Warin et al., supra note 28, at 37 (citing a story where two entrepreneurs
attempting to open a fireworks business in China spent nearly $44,000 on gifts and
hospitality for government officials in order to secure necessary permits and licenses).
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design compliance measures. 232 If the facilitation payment exception
is removed entirely, firms may move from implementing monitoring
programs to questioning whether it still makes sense to seek opportu-
nities in China at all. Regulators might ultimately conclude that the
social and economic harms of corruption justify the risk of market exit
presented by bans on all bribe payments. But if that is the case, it will
require a detailed analysis of foreign and domestic economic policy
that goes beyond the scope of this Article.
B. Enhanced Regulatory Guidance
As the foregoing discussion suggests, changing the FCPA to
either allow all bribes or to clearly prohibit all bribes would not be
without controversy. In addition to the potential objections already
mentioned, both options would also require fairly drastic changes to
the current version of the law.
Other reforms exist that are more measured and would involve
working within the FCPA's existing framework. For example, firms
would certainly benefit from enhanced regulatory guidance on the
enforcement standards that regulators apply in cases of solicitation or
extortion. This would mean clarifying the definition of "foreign offi-
cial," the meaning of "instrumentality" of a foreign government, and
the way regulators interpret the FCPA's corrupt intent and business
nexus requirements.2ss Common law principles hold that "everything
232 See id. at 63.
233 So far there has been minimal formal regulatory guidance on the FCPA. The
SEC issued two short rules in 1979 to prohibit issuers from falsifying books and
records or making material misrepresentations regarding books and records. See Fal-
sification of Accounting Records, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-1 to -2 (2010). Other regula-
tions were promulgated shortly after the FCPA's enactment to establish a procedure
whereby firms can obtain opinion releases from the DOJ in response to particularized
inquiries. See Westbrook, supra note 3, at 563. This system is similar to the SEC no-
action letter procedure. See id. at 564. It allows firms to request an opinion from the
DOJ on proposed transactions before they occur to see if they would lead to a viola-
tion of the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions. See id. The DOJ Opinion Procedure does
not affect a firm's obligations under the FCPA's accounting or internal control provi-
sions. Firms are granted a presumption of compliance with the FCPA if they go for-
ward with a transaction in conformity with the DOJ's opinion. Id. at 564 n.429. The
DOJ opinion procedure is rarely used, however. See id. at 563. Firms are often reluc-
tant to communicate the nature of a particular transaction with the DOJ out of fear
that it will expose them to greater levels of FCPA scrutiny and potential investigations
down the road. The opinion procedure is also of limited use given how particularized
it is. An opinion may help a firm in one transaction but does little to set standards for
future activities. This procedure is also of little use to firms that face unexpected
bribe demands or extortionate threats. Time is of the essence in those situations, and
firms will not have time to wait for a response from the DOJ. Instead, firms need
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that is not prohibited is permitted (nulum crimen sine lege)."234 Since
the FCPA allows certain types of payments that arise in cases of extor-
tion or solicitation, at a minimum regulators should clarify the divid-
ing lines between lawful and unlawful conduct. Regulatory guidance
that accomplishes this goal will lead to greater predictability and,
hopefully, more consistency in the application of the statute.
Regulatory guidance also does not necessarily need to be limited
to formal rule-making. Regulators should work to promote greater
levels of informal dialogue with firms and assist them in developing
appropriate responses to bribe demands and extortionate threats. As
matters stand, firms have little incentive to approach the DOJ or SEC
on these issues because doing so can lead to subsequent enforcement
proceedings. If regulators can step back from an adversarial stance
and work on fostering dialogue and mutual trust with firms it can
transform the nature of a regulatory encounter from one of confron-
tation to one of cooperation. 235
This will aid both parties. For firms, hopefully they will begin to
gain a better sense of what conduct will bring the most scrutiny, as
well as what they can do to lawfully respond to bribe demands. Regu-
lators will gain by getting a thorough view of the challenges that firms
face when doing business in certain parts of the world. Because brib-
ery typically takes place in secret, firms on the receiving end of bribe
demands are uniquely positioned to provide regulators with an inside
look at how corruption occurs. In addition, prosecutors often do not
have much experience working in business, much less experience in
the particular industries where corruption is most common.236 Estab-
lishing lines of communication with firms will help regulators under-
stand the costs and difficulties associated with the frequent demand-
side origins of bribery and extortion.
C. Demand-Side Intervention
Improved regulatory guidance should be one part of FCPA
reform, but it cannot be a complete solution. The FCPA's supply-
sided orientation, while logical in light ofjurisdictional concerns, ulti-
mately means that firms will continue to face pressures from bribe-
guidance that is both standard-setting and forward-looking if they are to be able to
design effective and efficient compliance systems. See id. at 563-65.
234 SHEARMAN & STERLINc LLP, supra note 40, at xiv.
235 See AYRES & BRAITH-WAYTE, supra note 138, at 34.
236 SeeJennifer Arlen, Removing Prosecutors from the Boardroom: Limiting Prosecutorial
Discretion to Impose Structural Reforms, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM 62-63
(Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow eds., 2011).
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seeking officials unless additional steps are taken. Even if focusing on
the supply side provides some levels of deterrence, accepted princi-
ples of law enforcement strategy suggest that optimal deterrence can
only be accomplished through regulatory initiatives directed to both
supply and demand.237 Put simply, foreign officials who approach a
corrupt transaction knowing that they face little chance of being pros-
ecuted will be more inclined to put pressure on firms to pay bribes.
And if firms find that limited regulatory interdiction on the demand
side increases the frequency of bribe solicitation or extortion, at some
point they may feel that they have no choice but to acquiesce to
requests for corrupt payments. This is especially true when firms can
expect other companies to step into their place and make payments
when they refuse to do so, or when they are under such financial pres-
sures that bribery is viewed as the only chance for survival.238
A more balanced enforcement policy that confronts both supply
and demand will help address these concerns by discouraging foreign
officials from asking for bribes or from being willing to accept them,
thereby reducing the available market for corruption. To its credit,
the DOJ appears willing to take steps in this direction. Since the
FCPA does not address passive bribery, in some cases the DOJ has
turned to alternative methods to target corrupt foreign officials for
their role in bribery transactions.
One strategy involves the use of disgorgement proceedings. Fol-
lowing its 2008 FCPA enforcement action against Siemens AG, the
DOJ initiated forfeiture proceedings against bank accounts located in
Singapore. 239 These accounts were selected because they contained
money that had been transmitted through U.S. banks to facilitate the
payment of bribes to foreign public officials in Bangladesh. 240 In
another example, the DOJ recovered $1.58 million in bribes that were
received by a foreign official in Haiti and laundered in the United
237 See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 99, at 223.
238 These considerations pose the risk of creating a slippery slope. Fundamentally,
all criminal laws create an incentive for actors who commit violations to seek to cover
their tracks. But in the context of passive bribery, this means that firms which decide
to give in to bribe requests for economic reasons will be prone to resorting to finan-
cial innovations and "creative" accounting devices to hide their corrupt transactions.
See Brademas & Heimann, supra note 110, at 21 ("Because bribes must be paid in
secret, normal systems of checks and balances do not function . . . . A company that
decides to bribe must engage in a pattern of deception involving off-the-books trans-
actions and secret bank accounts. The normal control system, including auditors,
lawyers, and boards of directors, must be kept in the dark.").
239 See Complaint at 1-3, United States v. All Assets Held in the Name of Zasz
Trading and Consulting, No. 1:09-cv-00021-JDB (D.D.C. Jan. 8, 2009).
240 See id.
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States.241 DOJ officials have pointed to these cases as examples of
their willingness to prosecute not only companies and executives who
pay bribes, but also those individuals who stand on the other side of
the transaction. 242
The DOJ has also used other criminal laws to target foreign offi-
cials involved in bribery schemes. For example, in December 2009 the
DOJ indicted Robert Antoine and Jean Rene Duperval, two former
employees of the Republic of Haiti's state-owned national telecommu-
nications company (Haiti Teleco).243 Both Antoine and Duperval
allegedly accepted bribes from U.S. telecommunications companies
that sought to do business with Haiti Teleco. Since these officials
could not be prosecuted under the FCPA for receiving bribes, the
DOJ instead charged them with violations of the federal money laun-
dering statute. 24 4
It remains to be seen whether these efforts will substantially deter
foreign officials from demanding bribes. The examples above aside,
disgorgement proceedings and money laundering actions against cor-
rupt foreign officials continue to be rare. Part of the problem is that
they suffer from the same diplomatic and jurisdictional concerns that
initially led Congress to limit the FCPA's scope to cover active bribery
only.
This is where international cooperation has to come into play.
Little progress will be made in deterring demand-side corruption if
states do not work together to root out and prosecute corrupt foreign
officials wherever they happen to be found. The good news is that the
past two years have seen an increasing number of countries adopt
anti-bribery legislation and more frequent cross-border collaboration
between authorities in the United States and other countries. In July
2010, Transparency International noted that the number of countries
with active anti-bribery enforcement measures increased from four to
241 See generally Indictment, United States v. Esquenazi, No. 09-21010-CR-COOKE
(S.D. Fla. Dec. 4 2009) (using all the various consulting fees that were allegedly paid
as bribes and subsequently laundered).
242 See Mike Koehler, Holder to Corrupt Foreign Officials-We Are Coming After Your
Money, FCPA PROFESSOR (Nov. 9, 2009, 12:52 PM), http://fcpaprofessor.blogspot.
com/2009/11/holder-to-corrupt-foreign-officials-we.html (noting that U.S. Attorney
General Eric Holder recently announced a "redoubled commitment on behalf of the
[DOJ] to recover" funds obtained by foreign officials through bribery).
243 See Indictment, supra note 241, at 3, 5, 22.
244 See SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, supra note 40, at 42, 95 (noting that other
foreign officials in recent FCPA cases have been charged with money laundering
offenses based on their role in transporting bribes across state lines).
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seven within the past year.2 45 The United States has also been one of
the most proactive nations in terms of facilitating international coop-
eration in law enforcement and is well positioned to provide assis-
tance if foreign regulators are open to cooperation. For example, the
DOJ's Criminal Division currently has resident advisors in thirty-seven
countries, and the FBI has agents in seventy-five foreign cities.246
Moreover, both the OECD Convention and the UNCAC include
provisions on cooperation, and the United States is a party to eighty
bilateral treaties on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters and
133 on extradition.247 Mutual legal assistance provisions in these
instruments typically require countries to provide assistance "to the
fullest extent possible under relevant laws, treaties, agreements and
arrangements" in connection with investigations and prosecutions
that arise under them.24 8 This assistance may include conducting
searches and seizures, serving court documents, and tracing, freezing,
and recovering assets. Mutual legal assistance provisions also help
facilitate cooperation and communication between law enforcement
agencies in different states, with the goal being that the state best posi-
tioned to prosecute a given offender will have all the necessary
resources to do so.
The bad news is that is that the success rate of international coop-
eration remains mixed. Some efforts at cooperation have been
received positively, while others have been met with limited or no
response. Success in this area will likely depend on the willingness of
U.S. officials to open direct lines of communication with foreign gov-
ernments at the highest level. This in turn will require firms to be
open to reporting instances of solicitation or extortion to their own
government officials, such as members of the trade department of
their local embassy, so that this information can be passed along to
the relevant foreign regulators.
245 See Press Release, Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Efforts to Curb Foreign
Bribery Remain Inadequate (July 28, 2010), available at http://www.transparency.
org/news_room/latest-news/press-releases/2010/201 0_07_28_oecdprogress
report.
246 See Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att'y Gen., Crim. Div., Dep't ofJustice, Remarks
at Council on Foreign Relations (May 4, 2010), available at http://www.cfr.org/inter-
national-law/international-criminal-law-enforcement-rule-law-anti-corruption-
beyond/p22048. The SEC has agreed to bilateral enforcement memoranda of under-
standing with twenty foreign securities commissions and is a signatory of the Interna-
tional Organization of Securities Commissions' multilateral memorandum of
understanding (IOSCO MMOU). See CHARLES DOYLE, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICA-
TION OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAw 22-23 (2010).
247 See OECD Phase 3 Report, supra note 5, at 54.
248 See UNCAC, supra note 213, at ch. IV, art. 46.
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A final component of international cooperation that is especially
significant in the fight against solicitation and extortion is the role
played by NGOs, trade associations, and other groups. These organi-
zations perform two key functions: monitoring and education. As
with treaty regimes that depend on monitoring for success, the pri-
mary consequence of a state's failure to prosecute its own corrupt offi-
cials will be reputational harm. 249 NGOs are well-positioned to track
and publicize information like prosecution rates and enforcement of
domestic anti-bribery laws. For their part, trade associations can
engage all firms within a given industry on the subject of solicitation
and extortion and share that information with the relevant law
enforcement authorities.
Depending on the relationships they are able to establish with
firms, NGOs may further be able to publicly share the identities of
known extortionists or perpetrators of corrupt schemes. Companies
will be reluctant to provide this information if their identities will be
revealed. However, if they are provided with anonymity, this informa-
tion will prove extremely useful. Other firms can use it as they con-
sider entering various markets. It will also put public pressure on
governments to address demand-side corruption within their borders.
Something similar occurred when Transparency International and
others harshly criticized the way United Kingdom's regulators han-
dled their investigation into potential acts of bribery by BAE Systems
PLC. 250 This criticism eventually prompted the passage of the Bribery
Act of 2010 and brought the United Kingdom closer to compliance
with the OECD Convention.251 At the very least, risk-averse bribe-
seekers will be less prone to request bribes or make extortionate
threats if they feel their names could become exposed.2 5 2
249 See Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties'End: The Past, Present, and Future of International
Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1246 (2008).
250 The BAE matter generated controversy after the company successfully lobbied
the U.K.'s Serious Fraud Office (SFO) to terminate its investigation into potential
bribes paid in connection with a trade deal between Great Britain and Saudi Arabia.
See Karl West, Campaigners Fury at f 286M Deal to End Corruption Probe After BAE Systems
Admits Using Cash to Win Contracts, DAILY MAIL ONLINE (Feb. 6, 2010, 9:30 AM), http:/
/www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1 248832/BAE-Systems-pay-280m-criminal-fines-
settling-corruption-charges.html. The U.K.'s High Court found associates of BAE
applied illegal political pressure to end the inquiry, but this ruling was subsequently
overturned by the House of Lords. See id.
251 See Adrienne Margolis, Bribery Bill Brings UK Closer to OECD Rules, INT'L BAR
Ass'N, http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=dbfdfe9-074c-4b79-a7
f8-laed7e44b3b8 (last visited Oct. 14, 2011).
252 See WRAGE, supra note 66, at 127.
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CONCLUSION
Theodore Sorensen, former Special Counsel to PresidentJohn F.
Kennedy, once remarked that "corporate bribery abroad is not the
simple, safe issue it seems at first blush."25 3 This is particularly true in
light of the challenges that transnational firms face when confronted
with solicitations for bribes and extortionate threats. Current FCPA
enforcement activities clearly alert firms that these types of demands
are no excuse for paying bribes. At the same time, unique practical
complexities associated with international commerce and the aggres-
sive approach that federal regulators have taken when interpreting
the FCPA make designing programs to resist solicitation and extortion
increasingly difficult.
To address these concerns, this Article urges federal regulators to
provide enhanced regulatory guidance so that firms will have a better
understanding of the FCPA's application in cases of solicitation and
extortion. It further proposes that regulators in the United States and
other countries commit to fighting corruption on the demand side by
directly targeting foreign officials who solicit and receive bribes. This
will require meaningful and consistent international cooperation, as
well as a commitment on the part of NGOs and other groups to moni-
tor progress and educate firms and governments on the issues sur-
rounding solicitation and extortion.
Deterring foreign officials from demanding or accepting bribes is
important because it will reduce the incidence of corruption. It
should also help firms implement efficient compliance programs that
will enable their agents and employees to spend less time worrying
about how to respond to bribe requests and more time on legitimate,
value-enhancing transactions.
253 Sorensen, supra note 170, at 719.
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